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ABSTRACT
Elements of an advanced functional framework for reusable rocket engine propulsion
system control are presented for the space shuttle main engine (SSME) demonstration case.
Functional elements of the baseline functional framework are defined in detail. SSME
failure modes are evaluated and specific failure modes identified for inclusion in the
advanced functional framework diagnostic system. Active control of the SSME start
transient is investigated, leading to the identification of a promising approach to mitigating
start transient excursions. Key elements of the functional framework are simulated and
demonstration cases are provided. Finally, the advanced functional framework for control
of reusable rocket engines is presented.
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SECTION 1 PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The objective of this program is to develop a functional framework for control of reusable
rocket engine propulsion systems used on future launch vehicles. The framework applies to a
variety of of propulsion systems and provides, in the design, the capability to enhance engine
performance with increased reliability, durability, and maintainability. This capability is
achieved through improved control algorithms, additional instrumentation, and additional
actuation hardware. Specific details of the framework functional elements are based on an
SSME derivative engine to facilitate validation on the SSME technology testbed.
The Reusable Rocket Engine Intelligent Control System Framework Design (RREICS)
program was funded by the NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio and was
monitored by Dr. W. Merrill.
The RREICS framework design program is one element of an integrated program undertaken
by NASA-LeRC to develop an advanced control system for future reusable rocket engine
propulsion systems. Other related efforts include the development of a real-time diagnostic
system framework (NASA-LeRC), development of specific diagnostic capabilities (under
contract to NASA-LeRC), development of detailed fatigue damage models (NASA-LeRC), and
advanced control concepts for reusable rocket engines (NASA-LeRC).
The RREICS program is divided into two phases. In the phase I program (Re:l), the
requirements for a RREICS functional framework were defined and candidate •functional
capabilities were identified. The candidate functional capabilities were then evaluated using a
figure of merit developed in the RREICS program. Based on the figure of merit evaluations,
functional capabilities for the framework were selected and an integrated functional framework
was synthesized. The phase I program resulted in a functional framework for control of
reusable rocket engine propulsion systems within the constraints of near term capabilities.
The Reusable Rocket Engine Intelligent Control System Framework Design phase II program
was a 12 month continuation of the phase I contract. The objectives of the RREICS Phase II
program were to demonstrate and further define elements of a functional framework for
integrated, adaptable control of reusable rocket engines.
The ICS phase II program consisted of five relatively independent tasks:
1. Definition of the baseline functional framework (BFF) to the next level of detail,
2. Definition of specific SSME diagnostic capabilities,
3. A feasibility study of closed loop control during the SSME start transient,
4. Demonstration of fundamental ICS concepts using dynamic system simulations, and
5. Definition of an ICS advanced functional framework (AFF).
(•
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SECTION 2 INTRODUCTION
Conventional rocket engine propulsion systems are a collection of independent engines. Each
engine is controlled to the same commanded power level and is operated autonomously. In this
configuration, the reliability and useful life of the engine cluster is completely dictated by the
"weak link" in the system. The objective of the Reusable Rocket Engine Intelligent Control
System (RREICS) functional framework design is to increase the reliability, extend the useful
life, and increase the performance of the engine cluster through new control schemes,
diagnostic capabilities, and actuation.
The RREICS framework describes a controller that controls the rocket engine cluster as a
single system rather than as a collection of independent engines and allows for accommodation
of engine degradations at the engine level without affecting the propulsion system output.
Control of the engine cluster as a single system enables shortcomings in the operation of an
individual engine to be mitigated by offloading some of the workload to other engines. The
result is that the "weak link" is operated at lower stress levels, effectively increasing the
reliability and useful life of the rocket engine cluster. Engine stress levels are further reduced
by functional elements at the engine level that respond to the engine operating conditions.
The effectiveness of engine level functions to increrase engine reliability, extend engine life,
and increase engine performance is limited by the highly coupled engine configuration. Only
relatively minor adjustments to the engine are possible within the constraints of thrust and
mixture ratio control. However, propulsion level coordination of the engine cluster enables
significant increases in the overall propulsion system reliability, useful life, and performance as
described in this report. This report demonstrates fundamental concepts used in the framework
and describes the benefits and limitations expected of each functional element.
Section 3 describes the baseline functional framework at the tier two level of detail. The
function of each element in the framework is illustrated and a description is included.
Section 4 evaluates the SSME failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and critical items list
(CIL). Specific diagnostic capabilities for the RREICS are identified and characterized to
include required engine measurements, failure severity, and failure likelihood.
Section 5 discusses the feasibility of closed loop control during the SSME start sequence to:
- desensitize the system to engine parameter variations
- desensitize the system to external perturbations or noise
- improve the system performance
- increase the engine reliability
- reduce the SSME maintenance costs
Several approaches by which closed loop control may be used to increase the SSME
performance and safety during startup are evaluated to determine if such closed loop control is
possible.
Section 6 uses a dynamic model of the SSME and simplified RREICS functions to demonstrate
the feasibility and utility of several fundamental concepts in the framework. Concepts
demonstrated are: 1) the ability to control engine variables other than thrust and mixture ratio
while maintaining a specified thrust and mixture ratio, 2) the ability to rapidly and smoothly
change engine variables using a multivariable controller, and 3) the ability to coordinate a three
engine cluster using downthrust factors as feedback. Since the goal of the simulation effort is
to demonstrate feasibility, no effort to optimize the control gains was expended beyond that
required to demonstrate the control feasibility.
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..Finally,in Section7, the advanced functional framework is presented and each functional
element is described.
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SECTION 3 DETAILED BASELINE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The baseline functional framework (BFF) defined in Phase I of this contract [Re: 1] was
modified in Phase II to clearly delineate the ICS diagnostic functions. Additionally, each
functional element of the modified BFF was further defined to identify the functional level one
tier below that presented in the phase I BFF framework.
3.1 Baseline Functional Framework Revision 2.3
In the BFF Rev. 2.2 (Re: 1), the engine level diagnostics are distributed between the Engine
Diagnostics and Status (EDS) and Life Extension Coordinator (LEC) functions. The BFF Rev
2.2 EDS and LEC functions are replaced by three functional elements in the BFF Rev. 2.3: 1)
Engine Diagnostics, 2) Engine Coordination, and 3) Engine Status. The modified BFF,
identified as Revision 2.3, is shown in Figure 3-1. The changes made to create BFF Rev. 2.3
do not alter the overall function of the phase I BFF Rev. 2.2. The only difference is that a
distinct and complete engine diagnostic function has been def'med.
The Engine Diagnostics function represents all of the engine level diagnostics. Two distinct
categories of diagnostics are identified in the BFF: 1) diagnostics of conditions whichthe
engine can resolve or mitigate without changing thrust or mixture ratio (denoted by a C pref'r¢
in Figure 3-1), and 2) diagnostics of conditions that cannot be successfully mitigated without a
change in thrust or mixture ratio (denoted by an F prefix in Figure 3-1). The distinction
between diagnostic functions is made since the C class of conditions can be handled by the
engine level while the F class of conditions require intervention by the propulsion level
coordinator.
The Engine Coordinator functions interprets the C class diagnostic information and engine
variables to identify control actions that optimize the engine operating state according to a set of
adaptable rules. The Engine Coordinator has authority over the F7V, CCV, and LPOTV
valves only. In addition to directly controlling the F7V, CCV, and LPOTV, the Engine
Coordinator modifies the engine state by issuing a high pressure turbine temperature error to
the Primary Actuator Command Generator.
The Engine Status function interprets F class diagnostic information and issues an indication of
overall engine risk/stress to the propulsion level coordinator. Additionally, the Engine Status
function interprets C class diagnostic information since a severe C class condition would
require intervention by the propulsion level coordinator to mitigate the problem.
3.2 Tier 2 Baseline Functional Framework Descriptions
The ICS framework is hierarchical in nature with major functional elements divided between a
single propulsion level subsystem and engine level subsystems at each engine as shown in
Figure 3-1.
The propulsion level ICS acts to maintain vehicle propulsion parameters under both nominal
and degraded conditions. Parameters include the overall vehicle thrust, thrust vector, and
overall vehicle mixture ratio. Each of these parameters is held to the value commanded by the
mission coordinator (a higher level control function) by reconfiguring individual engine
operating states to accommodate propulsion system degradations. In addition, the propulsion
level ICS is responsible for managing overall propulsion system concerns such as propellent
tank pressurization.
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Theenginelevel ICS implementsthepropulsion level commands (thrust, mixture ratio, gimbal
angle) in the manner that is least stressful to the engine. In addition, alternate control modes
are employed, at the engine level, to meet propulsion level commands in the event of a
degraded control system. Details of each functional element are provided in the following
descriptions.
PROPULSION LEVEL FUNCTIONS
Thrust Vector Coordinator tFi_re 3-2)
The thrust vector coordinator is responsible for achieving and maintaining the vehicle thrust
vector required for mission completion. To achieve the required thrust vector, the coordinator
commands the thrust level and gimbal angles of each engine. The thrust vector is maintained
by comparing the required thrust vector to the estimated thrust vector and modifying the engine
commands to resolve any discrepancies.
Since the mission is dependent on the total thrust vector (not individual engine thrust vectors)
the coordinator has some degree of flexibility in the position and thrust assigned to each
engine. For example, three engines at 100% are equivalent to two engines at 109% and one at
82% (as far as the vehicle is concerned). Therefore, the primary coordination role of the thrust
vector coordinator can be described as ensuring that the vector sum of individual engine thrust
vectors equals the required vehicle thrust vector.
The thrust vector coordinator has control of all aspects of engine operation that influence the
thrust vector, including: thrust, gimbal position, engine lock-ups, and cutoffs. However, to
avoid continuous, minor changes in engine levels, a threshold must generally be exceeded
before any action is taken. If an engine degraded status flag indicates that an engine is unable
to implement thrust level changes, the thrust vector coordinator will freeze the thrust command
for that engine at its current level. This becomes an additional constraint to be considered in the
thrust vector calculations.
Relative engine thrusts are based on minimizing the downthrust factors and maximizing
specific impulse for the engine cluster while still achieving the required thrust vector. Both the
total thrust magnitude and direction of the thrust vector constrain the possible thrust distribution
among the cluster. For example, it may be possible to meet the thrust magnitude requirement
and still downthrust an engine but a failed gimbal actuator could make it impossible to
downthrust the engine and still meet the directional requirement. Therefore, the status of each
gimbal actuator, estimated engine thrusts, downthrust factor of each engine, and specific
impulse of each engine contribute to the thrust distribution commands.
Decisions to allow an engine to run, lockup an engine, or cutoff an engine are based on the
relative risk to the mission. The coordinator risk assessment considers the cutoff factors of
other engines, engine redlines, results of upthrusting other engines, time of flight remaining,
and the ability to maintain commanded thrust vector (gimbal status, available upthrust
capabilities). For example, the risk associated with engine cutoff is significantly higher after
the first engine has been cutoff. Therefore, it is expected that a more serious degradation (i.e.
higher failure risk) would be required before a second engine was cutoff.
Engine cutoff signals are issued if the engine cutoff factor is sufficiently large that the risk of
catastrophic failure outweighs the potential benefits of continued operataon. If an engine
indicates a failure risk (large cutoff factor) the coordinator compares it to an estimated risk
associated with engine cutoff and chooses the less risky option. The coordinator also has the
option of locking the engine in its current state if the cutoff factor is trending towards an
unacceptable limit. For example, if an engine redline measurement is approaching its cutoff
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limit, the thrust vector coordinator may elect to lockup the engine rather than allowing it to be
cutoff. Once locked, the thrust value may change, due to changing inlet conditions, and the
estimated engine thrust becomes a constraint to be considered while maintaining the required
thrust vector. Additionally, if the estimated risk associated with engine cutoff is so large that
engine cutoff directly results in a loss of mission, the thrust vector coordinator issues a redline
inhibit command to the engine level diagnostics to eliminate the possibility of cutoff under any
circumstances.
Fuel Utilization Coordinator (Fimn'e 3-3)
The coordination task is one of maintaining the weighted average of engine mixture ratios
(weighted by thrust) equal to the commanded vehicle mixture ratio.
The fuel utilization coordinator is responsible for achieving and maintaining the vehicle mixture
ratio at its commanded value. To achieve the commanded mixture ratio, the coordinator issues
mixture ratio commands to each engine. The mixture ratio is maintained by comparing the
commanded mixture ratio to the estimated mixture ratio and modifying the engine commands to
resolve any discrepancies. If an engine degraded status flag indicates that an engine is unable
to implement mixture ratio changes, the fuel utilization coordinator will freeze the mixture ratio
command for that engine at its current level. The basic strategy is to identify engines that
cannot change mixture ratio. These include engines that have been locked or those indicating a
degraded status. The weighted mixture ratio for each of these engines is determined. Then,
the mixture ratio required to make the weighted average of the cluster equal to the vehicle
mixture ratio command is calculated for the remaining engines. The appropriate mixture ratio
command is issued to each engine.
Tank Pressure Coordinator (Fi_gure 3-4)
The tank pressure coordinator is responsible for maintaining the vehicle propellent tank
pressures at their predetermined values. The tank pressure is maintained by comparing the
desired tank pressure to the measured tank pressure and issuing FTV and OTV commands to
resolve any discrepancies. The coordination task consists of determining the pressure error in
each tank, estimating the change in recirculation flow required to resolve the error, and
determining the FTV and OTV commands required to implement the change in total
recirculation flow. The contribution to the total recirculation flow, for a given change in the
FTV or OTV position, is dependent on the thrust of the associated engine. Therefore, the tank
pressure coordinator considers the required recirculation flow, thrust of each engine, current
position of FTV and OTV for each engine, lockup status of each engine, and FTV and OTV
status for each engine in determining the required actuator commands.
Propulsion Diagnostics and Status (Figure 3-5)
The propulsion diagnostics and status function provides estimates of the measured vehicle
thrust vector and mixture ratio to the appropriate coordinators. Diagnostic and status
information required for mission level decisions are passed to the mission coordinator. These
include: vehicle thrust, mixture ratio, propellent utilization rate, remaining propellents, and a
propulsion system risk factor. In addition, the propulsion diagnostic and status function
responds to risk assessment requests from the mission coordinator.
The vehicle thrust vector is estimated by the vector sum of individual engine thrust vectors.
Individual thrust vectors are determined using the estimated thrust from each engine and
measured gimbal angles. The rate of propellent utilization is directly measured by vehicle
propellent flowmeters. Mixture ratio is determined by the ratio of the measured propellent
flowrates. If a vehicle flowmeter fails, the sum of the engine flowrates is used to estimate the
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missingdata. Remainingpropellentsaredeterminedfrom tank levelmeasurements.If level
indicatorsarelost, subsequentdatais estimatedby subtractingtheintegralof thethemeasured
flowratefrom thelastknownvalue of remaining propellent.
A propulsion system risk factor is used to estimate the risk of operating at the current thrust
vector relative to possible abort modes. Issues that impact the risk factor for a specified thrust
vector include: the ability to achieve that thrust vector (gimbal and engine statuses), and the
thrust, cutoff factor, degraded status, lockup status, and cutoff status for each engine. For
example, a configuration where one engine has already been cutoff and a second is indicating
an increasing cutoff factor would have a high risk factor. An abort mode in which the second
engine could be cutoff, if the cutoff factor continues to increase, would have a much lower risk
factor.
Thrust vectors required to implement the possible abort modes are received from the mission
coordinator and a propulsion system risk factor is determined for the current thrust vector and
each abort mode. These values are sent to the mission coordinator. It is expected that other
major vehicle subsystems (e.g. GNC, Payload Management) would also provide estimates of
the relative risk associated with possible abort modes and thereby enable the mission
coordinator to maximize the likelihood of mission success by minimizing the overall vehicle
risk. For example, if a possible abort mode somewhat reduces the risk of catastrophic engine
failure but greatly increases the risk of missing an acceptable orbit it would not be
implemented.
ENGINE LEVEL FUNCTIONS
Ent, ine Command Generator (Fimn'e 3-6)
v
The engine command generator is responsible for maintaining the local engine thrust and
mixture ratio required by the propulsion level. Propulsion level commands to the engine are
each compared to estimates of local thrust and mixture ratio and appropriate commands are
issued for the turbopump discharge pressures. The discharge pressures influence propellent
flows into the MCC. The commands are sent to the primary actuator command generator and
are the fundamental control parameters for the engine.
Primary Actuator Command Generator (Fibre 3-7)
The primary actuator command generator implements the turbopump discharge pressure
commands. In addition, HPFT temperature is implemented as a secondary control variable
since the OPFV enables a tradeoff between HPOT and HPFT temperatures. Based on the
errors in each of these variables; FPOV, OPOV, and OPFV positions are determined and
issued to the actuators. The control strategy calculates actuator positions resulting in no
turbopump discharge pressure errors and minimizing the HPFT temperature error. If an
actuator fails, HPFT temperature control is forfeited since it does not impact current mission
success. The remaining two actuators are used to maintain turbopump discharge pressure
control. For example, if the OPOV fails, turbopump discharge pressure errors are resolved
using the FPOV and OPFV at the possible expense of the resulting turbine temperature.
Thrwt and Mixture Ratio Estimator (Figm'e 3-8)
The thrust estimate is based on MCC pressure and is corrected for MCC mixture ratio
(estimated by MCC temperature). Redundant transducers are used in the MCC so that no
alternate estimation technique is required for thrust. The primary estimate of engine mixture
ratio is the ratio of measured oxidizer mass flow rate to fuel mass flow rate into the engine.
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Both flows are corrected for propellent temperatures as needed. Since redundant flowmeters
pose additional risk to the engine, only single measurements are baselined. If a flowmeter
fails, the mixture ratio is estimated analytically using the remaining flowmeter (this is the
estimation technique currently used on the SSME).
Engine Coordinator (Figure 3-9)
The Engine Coordinator function controls the F/V, CCV, and LPOTV to maintain certain
engine parameters within specified ranges. The parameters selected for coordination, as well
as the valves used to control the parameters, can be controlled with relatively little effect on the
engine thrust and mixture ratio. The small perturbations in thrust and mixture ratio caused by
the Engine Coordination function are accounted for by the Engine Command Generator and are
therefore transparent to the propulsion level.
Each parameter is compared to its current acceptable range and an error signal is generated to
quantify the compliance with that range. If the parameter falls within its specified range, an
error signal of 0.0 is issued. The response of each valve is determined by the weighted sum of
the measured errors. The errors are weighted according to the relative change in the coinciding
parameter effected by each valve.
A nominal set of parameter ranges are defined to optimize engine performance, minimize wear
and damage, and reduce the risk of engine failure. Alternate acceptable ranges are selected
based on engine conditions indicated by the Engine Diagnostics function.
The error weighting factors are different if the errors are resolved without using all three valves
(F/V, CCV, LPOTV). To accommodate changes in error weighting factors, an alternate set of
factors is selected if the F7V, CCV, or LPOTV are locked up by the Actuator Diagnostics
function.
t_n_ne Diagnostics (Figure 3-10)
The Engine Diagnostics function reduces engine measurements to quantified conditions and/or
degradations of engine components that the Engine Status Function and Engine Coordinator
can interpret. Examples of the diagnostic capabilities required are shown in Figure 3-1b,
while a more complete list is developed in Section 4.0.
Actuator Di_ostics. Gimbal Dia_ostics (Fibre 3-11)
The status of each actuator is monitored by the actuator diagnostics module. Actuator
commands from the primary actuator command generator, the life extension coordinator, the
tank pressure coordinator, and the valve sequence coordinator are used to drive actuator
models. The model response is compared to the measured actuator response (monitored using
position indicators). Unresponsive actuators are identified as "failed" and locked in their
current positions. If a lockup command is received from the thrust vector coordinator, all
engine control actuators are locked at their current positions. The gimbal actuator diagnostics
are also model based and are the same as the actuator diagnostic functions described above.
Engine Status (Fim.u'e 3-12)
The engine status function evaluates key engine health indicators, reports the engine status to
the propulsion level controller, and handles engine redlines. Key status indicators sent to the
propulsion level are the estimated mixture ratio, the estimated thrust, the specific impulse of the
engine, the heat exchanger status, and health indicators (cutoff factor, downthrust factor, and
degraded status flag).
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/ Redlines are handled by the Engine Status function. If a redline value is exceeded, a cutoff
command is directly issued to the valve sequence coordinator. This is the only engine level
cutoff capability and serves as an engine saving "reflex" in the event of rapid engine failures.
However, this reflex can be inhibited by the thrust vector coordinator to prevent engine cutoffs
that result in a loss of mission.
In addition, the Engine Status functions calculates engine health parameters that act as
recommendations to the propulsion level ICS functions. The intention of this feature is to
reduce the large amounts of engine data and send only "status" type parameters to the
propulsion level. Values sent to the propulsion level include: 1) specific impulse, 2) degraded
status, 3) downthrust factor, and 4) cutoff factor. The engine diagnostic function also sends
estimated thrust and mixture ratio to the propulsion level where they are used to verify that
commands are implemented.
Specific impulse is estimated using the thrust estimate and the measured p .ropellent flowrates.
This parameter provides an indication of how efficiently the engine is operaung.
The degraded status indicates that the engine is no longer capable of full thrust and mixture
ratio throttling. For example, if the FPOV fails, the engine can still maintain closed loop
control over the thrust and mixture ratio with the OPOV and the OPFV but can not implement
"large" changes in either variable. This parameter is a pass/fall type status and alerts the thrust
vector and mixture ratio coordinators that the engine commands should not be changed.
The downthrust factor is a measure that reflects the expected benefit of reducing thrust.
Primarily, downthrusting relieves strain on the high pressure turbopumps. Therefore, this
factor is defined by measurements indicative of excessive turbopump strain, in other words:
speed, torque, turbine temperature, and vibration. These measurements are evaluated for both
high pressure turbopumps (HPOTP and HPFTP) and are related to the benefit realized by
downthrusting the engine. The overall benefits of incorporating the downthrust factor in the
RREICS framework include degraded engine accommodation, risk minimization, and life
extension issues.
The cutoff factor is a measure that reflects the risk associated with continued engine operation.
Other studies [Re: Health Management System For Rocket Engines, NASA-LeRC] have
shown that engine failures are often indicated well before the failure occurs by changes in key
engine parameters. The weighted sum of these changes generally increases as the degradation
(impending failure) progresses and propagates through the system. It is expected that these
values can be roughly correlated to the relative "risk" of engine failure and therefore provide a
good source of information for an intelligent system to make engine cutoff decisions.
Valve Seauence Coordinator (Fima'e 3-13)
The valve sequence coordinator is responsible for safely starting and stopping the engine.
When a start command is received from the propulsion level, actuator commands are issued in
a preset sequence designed to minimize adverse affects associated with the start transient (e.g.
the CCV is throttled down during early stages of the start sequence to provide additional
cooling to the MCC). During mainstage, the valve sequence coordinator prepares for cutoff by
updating the scheduled cutoff sequence in response to actuator failures. For example, if the
FPOV fails (and is therefore locked in its current position) the actuator commands are
resequenced to minimize the risk of catastrophic failure at cutoff. Initially, an alternate cutoff is
selected from a set of predetermined sequences to ensure a timely response. Then this
sequence is optimized to determine if a "better" sequence can be identified and validated (using
a system model). The new sequence replaces the predetermined one. Therefore, upon receipt
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of a cutoff command, the "best" cutoff sequence is issued for the current engine status.
Actuators continue to be monitored during the cutoff and the sequence is altered, according to
predetermined rules, in response to actuator failures.
3.2 Conclusions About the Baseline Functional Framework
The ICS baseline functional framework (BFF) identifies control capabilities that result in
increased engine reliability, increased engine performance, and greater engine life by adapting
the engine control in response to measured conditions. However, several significant
limitations exist in the BFF. They are: 1) optimization of thrust, mixture ratio, and health
parameters at the engine level is limited by using only the OPOV, FPOV, and OPFV to
implement thrust and mixture ratio control, 2) life extension and performance optimization are
implemented independently of the primary control objectives (thrust and MR) and have only a
relatively minor impact on the engine, 3) feedback to the propulsion level is limited to
calculated parameters (e.g. the downthrust factor) that describe the global engine condition but
hide detailed engine information from the propulsion level. The BFF limitations result from
the inability to process and evaluate large amounts of engine data in real time and the lack of
detailed diagnostic and prognostic engine health algorithms. For the advanced functional
framework described in Section 5.0, the data processing and engine health algorithm
limitations are assumed to no longer exist.
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SECTION 4 DIAGNOSTIC SUBSYSTEM DEFINITION
This section further dcf'mes the diagnostics function to include a description of the failure
modes to be covered by the diagnostic system. The informational architecture, including
required sensed information and engine status output information (failure severity, failure
likelihood, etc.) is described.The rationale for failure mode selection is outlined below.
4.1 Failure Mode Database
Failure modes to be covered by the diagnostics system have been taken from the SSME
FMEA-CIL documents, RSS-8553-11 and RSS-8740-11, dated 15 July 1988. The SSME
FMEA was accomplished using a component functional analysis approach to identify the
potential failure modes. The failure modes were then evaluated to determine the worst-case
effect on engine, vehicle, crew and mission. The criticality code is determined by the worst-
case effects statement. The current (for this referenced document) SSME flight and software
configuration were analyzed. The depth of analysis is clown to Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU)/black box to identify all credible failure modes for that component. Failure mode
causes were identified by the FMEA to the piece-part level for critical failures. Criticality 1R
items were also analyzed to the lowest level necessary to verify that redundancy exists. Failure
likelihood for each mode is not available from the FMEA as a statistical quantity. The CIL
quotes number of seconds of operation for fleet leaders for various components including the
number of failure free starts.
The FMEA consists of the following volumes:
Volume I
Volume 1T
Volume IT[
Volume IV
Volume V
Volume VI
Volume VII
Volume VIII
Volume IX
Volume X
Volume XI
Volume XII
Executive Summary
Combustion Devices
Fuel Turbopumps
Oxidizer Turbopumps
Pneumatic Controls
Propellant Valves
Actuators
Controller
Harnesses
Igniters and Sensors
Lines, Ducts, Joints and Orifices
Flight Accelerometer Safety Cutoff System (FASCOS)
4.2 Selection of failure modes
Several cycles of screening have been used to extract candidate modes from the documentation
as follows:
A preliminary list of failure modes was extracted from the data base of greater than 400 items.
Emphasis was placed on modes amenable to corrective or mitigating action. Specific types of
failure modes excluded for the diagnostics system were:
Failures occurring in too short a time to take corrective action
Failures where no corrective action is possible
Failures leading to unconditional engine cutoff.
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This list of about 120 items was then reviewed in more detail for consideration of the various
phases of the launch and ascent profile to generate failure accommodation tables (as described
below). Some deletions were made, and the list was reduced to about 100 items.
Some failure modes where no corrective action can presently be taken will still be considered
where it may be possible to use new or additional sensors or where the candidate ICS valves
may be used for corrective action. Exceptions to other criteria will always be made when there
is some way the ICS may be used to accommodate, correct, or lessen the effect of a failure.
Additional modes that could apply to generic engine diagnostics may be added.
4.3 Failure Accommodation Tables
The phases of operation covered are indicated in the failure accommodation tables. These are
the same as indicated in the FMEA. An example is 0 = SMC. The five possible letters are
defined as follows:
Propellant Conditioning Phase (P) - Start of Purge Sequence 1
through Purge Sequence 4, ending with Start Command.
Start Phase (S) - Start Command to SRB Ignition (~ 5 seconds).
Mainstage Phase (M) - Starts at SRB Ignition and ends with Cutoff
Command at end of ascent phase.
Cutoff Phase (C) - Starts at MECO Command and ends with Zero
Thrust (includes on-pad cutoff following an aborted start and
any unique failure effect).
Dump (Post-Cutoff) Phase ('D) - Begins with Zero Thrust and ends
with completion of propellant dump including vacuum inerting.
Item numbers for the various components are the FMEA item numbers, which in most cases
are the same as the CIL reference numbers. Criticality codes (Crit = ) are included in the tables
for quick reference and the timing (t = ) is noted where:
I - Immediate -- less than one second
S = Seconds -- 1 to 60 seconds
M = Minutes -- 60 seconds to 60 minutes
N/A = No set timing (damage may occur during cutoff) --
Igniters and sensors generally have this timing
Notes concerning failure mode history included in the CIL may also be found in the Failure
Accommodation Tables. Tables for the volumes covered are found in Tables 4-1 through 4-6.
4.4 Excluded Volumes
The following volumes of the SSME FMEA were not included as ICS diagnostic candidates
for the reasons listed:
Actuators -- Volume VII
None of the actuator failure modes in the FMEA appear to be amenable to
accommodation or resolution by the diagnostic system functions. Most failures result
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in hydraulic or pneumatic lookup through redundancy and fail-safe mechanisms that are
built into the actuators.
Controller -- Volume VIII
The FMEA for the Controller will not be used because it is specific to the Block I
Controller for the SSME. The design of the ICS has not yet been accomplished and
may have significantly different architecture, packaging scheme and unique set of
failure modes.
Ducts/Lines, Joints and Orifices -- Volume XI
Failure modes associated with ducts/lines, joints and orifices will not be
accommodated by the diagnostic system directly. Large failures in these
components will, in general, lead very quickly to catastrophic enginefailure.
Minor leaks that do not lead to fh'e/explosion or overpressurization ot me art
compartment may be covered indirectly by pressure or flow anomalies detected by
various sensors. If optical or other leak detection systems are employed in the future,
their measurement data would be analyzed by the diagnostic system.
FASCOS-- VolumeXII
The Flight Accelerometer Safety Cutoff System (FASCOS) is an integral part of the
SSME Controller. It interfaces directly to the address and data bus of the controller.
ICS designs may or may not use this approach. Future turbopump designs may
incorporate bearing wear detection sensors capable of detecting/predicting oearing
failure modes (a major source of excessive vibration) much earlier and more definitively
than the present FASCOS. Thus, the way accelerometers are used may change
significantly. Severe vibration indicates that enough mechanical damage has already
occurred to make shutdown imperative.
4.5 Failure Accommodation Discussion
4.5.1 Combustion Devices
The main failure modes in this category involve the blockage of a fuel, oxidizer, or hot gas
flow. The failure of Augmented Spark Igniters (ASI) is also included. The failure of the ASIs
is not very likely. The Main Injector Fleet Leader has accumulated over 19,000 seconds and
60 starts without any anomalies (as of July, 1988). One in-flight failure occurred in 1984,
when a drill chip lodged in an Oxidizer Preburner fuel line (Item # A700-2). ASI chamber
erosion was discovered during post flight inspection, but no engine failure occurred because
the erosion was limited in scope.
No corrective action appears possible for the ICS other than engine shutdown if erosion is
present. There is no present or planned method for quan.tifying erosion. If erosion were
detected late in the ascent profile, downthrusting or increasing the coolant flow might be an
option for propulsion or mission level decision. Early detection by plume spectrometry would
help ensure shutdown before severe erosion caused major structural failures.
4.5.2 Fuel Turbopumps
The failure accommodation tables show that the method of detection and control system action
are very nearly the same for many of the failure modes. This is because of the method of
control used for the staged combustion cycle type of engine with variable thrust. Fuel pump
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output flow and pressure must be maintained to ensure proper mixture ratio and cooling. Any
anomaly that reduces output causes an increase in oxidizer to the fuel turbopump preburner to
increase turbine power. If the anomaly is a developing failure mode, pump output may
continue to decrease, and oxidizer input to the fuel preburner will be increased further. This
can escalate rapidly, and rising turbine discharge temperature may exacerbate the problem,
causing the failure mode to develop even more quickly. Rates at which the OPFV is modulated
to control mixture ratio during anomalous operation, however detected, should be carefully
monitored.
Correlation of rising turbine discharge temperature on the HPFI"P with other measurement
parameters should be made wherever possible to determine the specific failure mode.
Degraded status and updated downthrust factor must be relayed to the propulsion level of the
functional framework as quickly as possible to insure that potential engine cut-off actions are
timely while still being based on overall mission objectives. Additional sensors such as
bearing wear detectors and plume spectrometers that may give advance warning of turbopump
failures are highly recommended.
4.5.3 Oxidizer Turbopumps
As with the fuel turbopumps, the failure accommodation tables show that the method of
detection and control system action are very nearly the same for many of the failure modes.
Oxidizer pump output flow and pressure must be maintained to ensure that the proper thrust
levels for the mission profile are satisfied. Any anomaly that reduces output (as determined by
thrust calculations) causes an increase in oxidizer to the oxidizer turbopump preburner to
increase turbine power. A developing failure mode may cause output to conunue to decrease,
and oxidizer input to the oxidizer preburner will be increased further by opening the OPOV.
Rapid escalation of failure modes is also possible (and likely) in the HPOTP.
Again, the earliest possible detection of a failure mode is very important
and newer sensors and diagnostic methods should be employed.
4.5.4 Pneumatic Controls
This group of components has a very good history of reliability. Purge check valves are
simple in design compared with propellant valves and generally operate under less severe
conditions (no cryogenic fluid flow through the valve). Other components are somewhat more
complex, but they have been carefully designed and evolved through extensive testing. The
components are active mainly during Prestart, Start and Cutoff.
Only limited time for analysis/accommodation is available during Start and Cutoff. One
exception is the HPOTP Intermediate Seal Purge PAV that is very important during Mainstage
to maintain separation of LOX and fuel rich hot gas in the pump turbine. This seal purge
pressure is monitored by a pressure transducer whereas some other purge pressures are not
directly monitored. In general, this group may be of limited interest to the ICS except for
engine status.
4.5.5 Propellent Valves
The valves selected as candidates for ICS have demonstrated good reliability for the failure
modes described. The main propellant valves were not selected because they are moved on a
predef'med schedule to either fully open or fully closed positions, and are not used for thrust or
mixture ratio control. Opening rates and relative timing affect Start and Cutoff transients.
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Control is cffected through the two valves (FPOV and OPOV) that control the flow of oxidizer
to the preburners, and the Chamber Coolant Valve (CCV) is scheduled linearly with thrust
reference such that it will be partially open at minimum power level (65%) and fully open at the
100% thrust level. Heat transfer loads on the MCC and Nozzle do not decrease at a rate that
matches the decrease in total hydrogen flow when thrust is decreased. Therefore, the
CCV,which acts as a bypass valve, must be partially closed to force more of the available
hydrogen flow through these components at the lower thrust levels.
The preburner oxidizer valves may be opened or closed when the controllerattempts to
compensate for other failure modes (such as loss of impeller head rise in the HPFTP). This
may cause turbine discharge temperature to exceed redline limits. The bleed valves are not
operated by servoactuators, but they do have position feedback.
4.5.6 Igniters and Sensors
This group of components should receive close attention in considering failure mode candidates
for the ICS. The use of analytical redundancy should be considered wherever it is possible to
compensate for sensor failures. At present, temperature and pressure sensors are dual channel
devices, and critical measurements, e.g., MCC pressure, have redundant sensors.
The more important sensors may be categorized into three groups as defined in the following
tables. Thus, some measurements are more important during one phase of the mission than
another. HPFTP shaft speed, for example, is of secondary interest during Mainstage and
Cutoff.
,_.,.
Engine Ready Sensors:
a. LPFTP Discharge Pressure e.
b. LPFTP Discharge Temperature f.
c. Preburner Pump Discharge Temperature g.
d. LPOTP Discharge Pressure h.
Emergency Shutdown Pressure
Preburner Purge Pressures
MOV Hydraulic Temperature
MFV Hydraulic Temperature
Performance Control Sensors:
a. MCC Pressure
b. LPFTP Discharge Pressure
c. LPFTP Discharge Temperature
d. Fuel Flowrate
Engine Limit Control Sensors:
a. HPFTP Turbine Discharge Temperature f.
b. HPOTP Intermediate Seal Purge Pressure g.
c. HPOTP Secondary Seal Cavity Pressure h.
d. HPOTP Turbine Discharge Temperature i.
e. Preburner Shutdown Purge Pressure
HPPTP Coolant Liner Pressure
Ignition Confirm, MCC Pressure
Ignition Confirm, Antiflood Valve
Ignition Confmu, HPFTP Speed
Sensors not in these groups may be considered as flight data sensors only.
4.6 Informational Architecture
Block diagrams illustrating a proposed "informational architecture" have been prepared for
each of the FMEA volumes used for the data base. The diagrams may be found in Figure 4-1
through Figure 4-6. Intermediate actions that may be taken to accommodate or lessen the effect
of incipient failures, before a decision to cutoff, are shown for groups of failure modes that
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causesimilar symptoms(e.g., increasein turbine dischargetemperature). The threemain
actionsidentifiedare:downthrust,decreaseO/F,andincreasecoolantflow.
4.7 Diagnostic Subsystem Conclusions
The majority of FMEA criticality 1 failures for the SSME eventually lead to an engine
shutdown. However, the useful life of an engine can be extended by downthrusting, the
engine if the failure is detected in the early stages. For combustion device failures, rmnor
improvements in the engine life can be made by changing the engine mixture ratio and by
redistributing available coolant through the affected area of the engine.
i •
RIIRD91-158 PAGE 16
k,,,=
I
t.,4
OO
Failure
A050-1
O = SMC
A200-1
o=s
A200-2
O = SMC
A200-3
El = SMC
A200-5
13= SMC
A330-5
O = M
A340-1
El = M
A600-2
El = SMC
A600-3
El = SMC
A700
El=S
A700-2
El = SMC
A700-3
O = SMC
Table 4-1
Description
FMEA Summary- Combustion Devices
Powerhead -- Crit = 1
Liner failure t = S
Main Injector-- Crit = 1R
ASl falls to ignite t = S
Main Injector -- Crit = 1
Loss of fuel to ASl t = S
Main Injector-- Crlt = 1 t = S
Blockage of one LOX ASI passage
Main Injector -- Crit [] 1 t [] S
Partial blockage of an oxidizer orifice
MCC Crit [] 1R
Lee Jet Is blocked t [] S
Nozzle Assembly -- Crlt = 1R t [] S
Multiple Internal tube fuel leakage
Fuel Preburner-- Crit [] 1 R
ASI fails to Ignite t = S
Fuel Preburner-- Crlt -- 1
Loss of fuel to ASl t [] S
Fuel Preburner-- Crlt [] 1 t = S
Blockage of one LOX ASI passage
Oxidizer Preburner- Crlt = 3
ASI falls to Ignite t [] S
Oxidizer Preburner - Crlt [] 1
Loss of fuel to ASI t = S
Detected by
Rapid rise of turbopump
discharge temps
MCC pressure low
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
MCC pressure sensor
qualification limit exceeded
Turbine discharge temps
increase
HPOTP speed will not
reach lower limit
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
Turbine discharge temp
below lower limit
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
Control System Action
Engine shutdown during start phase .-quick detection will
minimize potential engine damage. No failure history
If detectable, englna shutdown before hlgh mlxture ratio
erosion leads to Injector burnout. No fallure hlstory.
If detectable, engine shutdown before erosion leads to
Injector burnout. No failure history.
Ifdetectable, engine shutdown before erosion leads to Injector
Ournout. Two cases (1979) - no effect during hotflre.
Disqualify sensor -- may choose not to allow electrical
Iockup if other MCC pressure sensor falls. No failure history.
-'nglne shutdown. If redlines not exceeded, try to adjust the
nixture ratio by modulation of the FPOV. Two cases (1979)
Engine shutdown -- redllne on lower limit of HPFTP
speed during Start. No failure history.
If detectable, engine shutdown before high mixture ratio
erosion leads to Injector burnout. No failure history.
If detectable, engine shutdown before erosion leads to
Injector burnout. No failure history.
Engine shutdown -- redline on lower limit of HPOTP turbine
discharge temp. No failure history.
If detectable, englne shutdown before hlgh mlxture retlo
eroslon leads to Injector burnout. One failure (1984)
If detectable, engine shutdown before erosion leads to
injector burnout. No failure history.
Oxidizer Preburner -- Crit [] 1 t [] S
Blockage of one LOX ASI passage
Erosion may be detected
by plume spectrometry
If not severe, may be able to downthrust or decrease O/F to
increase cooling. No failure history.
Failure
B200-1
O=SM
B200-2
t3= SM
B200"5
i
O=SM
B200-6
O=SM
B200-9
_= SM
B200-10
O=SM
B200-11
_=SM
Table 4-2
Description
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1R
Leakage past preburner G5 seal into
the HGM
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Energy loss at turbine inlet
FMEA Summary - Fuel TurboPumps (1 of 3)
Crit = 1R
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Rotor tip seal leakage
t=l
Crit = 1R
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Platform seal leakage
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1R
Pressure drop or flow distortion at
Impeller inlet
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Loss of Impeller head rise
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1R
Excessive Impeller bypass leakage
t=l
Detected by
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and vibration
may increase
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
Control System Action
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may Increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may Increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine output causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. Early test failure (1984).
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Table 4-2 FMEA Summary - Fuel TurboPumps (2 of 3)
Failure
B200-12
El= SM
B200-13
El= SM
B200-15
El = SMC
B200-16
El = SMC
B200-17
El=SM
B200-20
El= SM
B200-21
El=SM
B200-24
El=S
Description
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Excessive pump interstage
seal leakage
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1R
Energy loss in diffusers and
housing
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Loss o! support or
position control
Crit = 1
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Loss of coolant flow to
turbine bearings
Crit = 1
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1
Loss of coolant flow to t=l
turbine discs
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Excessive coolant flow
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP -
Excessive hot gas leakage
into coolant circuit
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1 R
Shaft movement not restrained during
Start (shaft speeds below 12,000 rpm)
t=S
Detected by
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPFTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
Pump speed decrease and
Increased level of vibration.
May use spectrometry to
detect bearing wear
Excessive wear of races
or bearings may be
detected by plume spec-
trometry
None at present
Rise in coolant liner
pressure
Rise in coolant liner
pressure
Fast rise in turbine
discharge temp.
Rubbing or wearing may
be detected by plume
spectrometry.
Control System Action
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shut down. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shut down. No failure history.
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is Imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action is possible if turbopump fails quickly.
Two isolated failures (1985, 1983 ).
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action is possible if turbopump fails quickly.
No failure history.
TBD
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if coolant liner pressure exceeds the
i;edline limit. One failure --coolant liner buckle.
Leakage at lift-off seal caused overpressurization.
Engine shutdown if coolant liner pressure exceeds the
redline limit.
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if turbine discharge temp exceeds the
redline limit.
No failure history.
!P.
Failure
B600-1
EI=SM
B600-2
O= SM
B600-4
EI=SM
B600-5
t3= SM
B600-8
O=SM
Table 4-2
Description
Low Pressure Fuel TP -
Energy loss at turbine inlet
FMEA Summary- Fuel TurboPumps (3 of 3)
Low Pressure Fuel TP -
Power loss in rotor
Crit = 1R
t=l
Low Pressure Fuel TP -
Loss of head rise
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
Low Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1R
Loss of support or position control
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=S
Low Pressure Fuel TP -
Turbine seal leakage
Detected by
Rise in HPFTP turbine
discharge temp
Low shaft speed
Rise in HPFTP turbine
discharge temp
Low shaft speed
Rise in HPFTP turbine
discharge temp
Pump speed decrease and
increased level of vibration.
May use spectrometry to
detect bearing wear
Cavitation, if present, will
cause increase in HPFTP
turbine discharge temp
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action is possible if turbopump fails quickly.
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if turbine discharge temp increases to
redline limit. May shut down before limit if high vibration is
also present. No failure history.
Control System Action
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
!Failure
B400-1
El= SM
B400-2
El= SM
B400-4
Ei=SM
B400-5
.O=SM
B400-6
El= SM
B400-8
Ei=SM
B400-9
El=SM
Table 4-3
Description
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Leakage past outboard
OPB/HPOTP seal
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Energy loss at turbine
inlet due to excessive flow
distortion
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Turbine blade tip seal
leakage
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Turbine interstage seal
leakage
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Turbine discharge flow
blockage
FMEA Summary- Oxidizer TurboPumps (1 of 3)
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t:l
High Pressure Oxid. TP - Crit = 1R
Flow distortion at main
pump inlet t = I
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Loss of Inducer/Impeller
head rise
Crit = 1R
t=l
Detected by
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and vibratoion
may increase
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
Control System Action
i i
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. One test failure (1985).
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine output causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
t.h
OO
Failure
B400-10
O=SM
B400"11
£J= SM
B400-13
O = SMC
B400-15
0 = SMC
B400-18
EI=SM
B400-19
= SM
B400-20
O = SMC
/
Table 4-3
Description
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Energy loss at main pump
difuser
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Inadequate preburner
pump impeller head rise
FMEA Summary - Oxidizer TurboPumps (2 of 3)
Crit = 1R
t=l
Crit = 1R
t=l
High Pressure Fuel TP - Crit = 1
Loss of support or
position control t = I
High Pressure Oxid. TP - Crit - 1
Loss of purge pressure t = I
barrier
High Pressure Oxid. TP- Crit = 1
Loss of coolant flow to
bearings t = S
Crit = 1R
t=S
High Pressure Oxid. TP -
Loss of coolant flow to
turbine seals
High Pressure Oxid. TP Crit = 1
Coolant loss to 1st and 2nd
stage turbine components
t=S
Detected by
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
Pump speed decrease and
increased level of vibration.
May use spectrometry to
detect bearing wear
None at present
None at present
Excessive wear of races
or bearings may be
detected by plume spec-
trometry
Turbine secondary seal
cavity pressure meas.
Metallurgical deteriorization
may be detected by plume
spectrometer
None at present
Metallurgical deteriorization
may be detected by plume
spectrometer
Control System Action
iii ili
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shut down. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shut down. No failure history.
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action is possible if turbopump fails quickly.
Four failures during engine test
TBD
No failure history
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action Is possible If turbopump fails quickly.
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if redline is exceeded.
If correlated with plume measurements, shutdown with more
safety margin may be possible.
No failure history.
TBD
Early failures found only on disassembly and the causes
corrected (1985, 1983, 1982 )
Ot
OO
Failure
B800-1
O=SM
B800-2
0= SM
B800-4
O=SM
B800-5
0= SM
_B800-6
Igl= SMC
Table 4-3 FMEA Summary - Oxidizer TurboPumps (3 of 3)
Description
Low Pressure Oxid. TP - Crit = 1R
Seal leakage at turbine inlet
t=l
Low Pressure Oxid. TP -
Loss of turbine power
Crit = 1R
t=l
Low Pressure Oxid. TP -
Loss of Inducer head rise
Crit = 1R
t=l
Low Pressure Oxid. TP - Crit = 1R
Loss of dynamic head
recovery/guidance t = I
Low Pressure Oxid. TP -
Loss of support and
position control
Crit = 1
t=l
Detected by
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp Increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
HPOTP turbine discharge
temp increase toward
redline limit and pump
speed decreases
Pump speed decrease and
increased level of vibration.
May use spectrometry to
detect bearing wear
Control System Action
I
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may Increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. One test failure (1984).
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Initially, a decrease in turbine power causes an Increase in
preburner oxidizer to maintain pump flow and pressure, but
this may increase turbine discharge temp beyond the redline
limit and engine must be shutdown. No failure history.
Early detection of this mode by plume spectrometry or other
means is imperative to prevent vehicle loss by engine
shutdown. No action is possible if turbopump falls quickly.
One case of excessive vibration observed - no attributable
cause found during extensive inspections (1985)
Failure
C111
O=S
Cl12
0=S
Cl13-1
O = PS
Cl14
0 = PS
Cl16-1
O = PSC
Cl17-2
O=S
C20_7
O=PS
C200-8
Et= PSMC
<%"- ,
Table 4-4 FMEA Summary - Pneumatic Controls (1 of 2)
Description
FPB Purge Check Valve -
Check valve leaks
Crit = 3
t = N/A
OPB Purge Check Valve -
Check valve leaks
Crit = 3
t = N/A
Oxidizer Dome Purge Crit = 1
Check Valve - t = S
Fails to open or restricts flow
Fuel Purge Check Valve - Crit = 3
Fails to open or restricts
flowKT = I t - I
FPB ASI Purge Check Crit = 1, 3
Valve- t = S
Fails to open or restricts flow
OPB ASI Purge Check Crit = 3
Valve - t = I
Check valve leaks
PCA oxidizer system
purge -
Crit = 1
Insufficient or no N 2 purge flow
during conditioning t = M
PCA HPOTP Intermediate Crit- 1
Seal Purge--
Insufficient or no He purge flow
t=l
Detected by
Fuel and oxidizer
preburner shutdown
purge pressure
Fuel and oxidizer
preburner shutdown
purge pressure
None at present
HPOTP or HPFTP turbine
discharge temperature
None at present
Fuel and oxidizer
preburner shutdown
purge pressure
None at present
HPOTP intermediate seal
pressure
Control System Action
i i1|
Controller monitors pressure from Start to Start +2.3 seconds.
If redline limt is exceeded, engine is shutdown.
No failure history.
Controller monitors pressure from Start to Start +2.3 seconds.
If redline limt is exceeded, engine is shutdown.
No failure history.
TBD
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if redline exceeded.
No failure history.
TBD
No failure history
Controller monitors pressure from Start to Start +2.3 seconds.
If redline limt is exceeded, engine is shutdown.
No failure history.
TBD
Two failures: 1982, contamination; 1984, failed poppet
Controller monitors intermediate seal pressure for out of limit
condition. Start inhibit during Phase P. Engine shutdown
during SMC (redline).
No failure history.
OO
Table 4-4 FMEA Summary - Pneumatic Controls (2 of 2)
Failure
C200-11
J3=S
Description
PCA Emergency
Pneumatic Shutdown -
Failure to supply helium
pressurant
Crit = 1
t=l
Detected by
None at present
Control System Action
i
TBD
One failure on vehicle prelaunch test, 1984, contamination
C200-16
El = SMC
C300-1
(_ = PSC
C300-7
O = PSMC
PCA - Crit = 1
Fails to contain helium
t=l
Helium Prechargs Valve - Crit = 3,1
Insufficient or no He flow
to Pogo Accumulator t = I
Helium Precharge Valve -
Fails to contain oxidizer
Crit - 1
t=l
HPOTP intermediate seal
pressure
Pogo precharge pressure
None at present
Controller monitors intermediate seal pressure for out of limit
condition. Start Inhibit during Phase P. Engine shutdown
during SMC (redline).
No failure history.
Inhibit Start in Phase P
Engine shutdown in Phase S
TBD in Phase C - cavitation/overspeed of oxidizer
turbopumps possible at zero G and minimum NPSP.
No failure history.
TBD
No failure history.
Failure
D130-2
EI=SM
D140-2
O=SM
D150-1
O=SM
D210-4
£1=P
D220-4
O=P
Table 4-5
Description
FMEA Summary- Propellent Valves
Control System ActionDetected by
HPFTP or HPOTP turbine
discharge temperature
Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Crit = 1R
Valve -
Fails to move or moves slowly.
No SEll.
t=s
Oxidizer Preburner Crit - 1R
Oxidizer Valve -
Fails to move or moves slowly.
No SEll.
t=s
Coolant Control Valve - Crit = 1R
Fails to move or moves slowly, t -- I
No SEll.
Fuel Bleed Valve - Crit = 1R
Erroneous position feedback.
t=l
Oxidizer Bleed Valve - Crit = 1R
Erroneous position feedback.
t=l
HPFTP or HPOTP turbine
discharge temperature
HPFTP Or HPOTP turbine
discharge temperature
None at present
None at present
Engine cutoff if redline is exceeded.
See Note below:
No Failure history.
Engine cutoff if redline is exceeded.
See Note below:
No Failure history.
Engine cutoff if redline is exceeded.
See Note below:
No Failure history.
TBD
One failure, 1983 - manufacturing procedure changed.
TBD
No failure history.
Fleet leader has over 26,450 seconds hot fire time.
Note: One servoactuator failure is permitted with no change
in performance. Switching to redundant backup is automatic.
Continued presence of SEll initiates various shutdown
scenarios. When no SEll is present, turbine discharge
temperatures are the failure indication parameters.
SEll = Servoacutator Error Indication Interrupt
J203-1
Failure
Table 4-6
Description
J201-1
& J202-1
El=M
El = PSMCD
J205-1
O = PSMCD
J207-1El = PSMCD
P.
J208-1
El = PSMCD
J209-1
El = PSMCD
J210-1
El = PSMCD
FMEA Summary - Igniters and Sensors (1 of 5)
Crit = 1 RMCC Pressure
Transducer t = S
All sensors drift in the same direction
LPOTP Discharge Crit = 3
Pressure Transducer - t = N/A
No output or erroneous output
FPB Chamber Crit = 3
Pressure Transducer - t - N/A
No output or erroneous output
Oxidizer Tank Crit = 3
Pressurant Transducer - t = N/A
No output or erroneous output
HPFTP Discharge
Pressure Transducer -
Crit = 3
t= N/A
No output of erroneous output
HPOTP Boost Pump
Pressure Transducer -
Crit = 3
t - N/A
No output of erroneous output
Fuel Injection
Pressure Transducer -
Crit = 3
t = N/A
No output of erroneous output
HPFTP or HPOTP turbine
discharge temperatures
and OPOV command limit
Detected by Control System Action
i
Present action is shutdown if tempsor command limit
exceeded. It may be possible to synthesize PC based on
other measurements and compare to detect erroneous drift.
Three failures:
1977; port plugged with ice - added Lee Jet purge
1985; erroneous output, broken lead wire - new process
1987; zero shift due to link pin weld - new weld controls
None at present for
erroneous output
None at present for
erroneous output
None at present for
erroneous output
None at present for
erroneous output
None at present for
erroneous output
None at present for
erroneous output
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only
No failure history.
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J306-1
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J309
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J310
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J312
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J350
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& J352
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Table 4-6
Description
LPFTP Discharge
Temperature Transducer -
Erroneous output
MCC Coolant Outlet
Temperature Transducer -
Erroneous output
MOV Hydraulic
Temperature Transducer -
Erroneous output
MFV Hydraulic
Temperature Transducer -
Erroneous output
FMEA Summary - Igniters and Sensors (4 of 5)
Crit = 3,1 R
t=S
Crit = 3
t = N/A
Crit = 3
t = N/A
Crit = 3
t = N/A
HPOTP Boost Stage Crit = 3
Discharge
Temperature Transducer - t = N/A
Erroneous output
Crit = 3
t = N/A
MCC Oxidizer Injection
Temperature Transducer -
Erroneous output
MFV/OPV/AFV Skin Crit = 3,1 R
Temperature Transducers -
t=S
Erroneous output
Detected by
LPFTP Discharge
temperature qualification
limits.
None at present for
erroneous output.
None at present for
erroneous output.
None at present for
erroneous output.
None at present for
erroneous output.
None at present for
erroneous output.
Skin temperature launch
temperature commit criteria
limits.
No detection if within limits.
Control System Action
Failure of one channel during Start phase causes controller to
post MCF and the vehicle will command shutdown.
During mainstage, both channels bad deletes redline.
Two failures,1982; intermittent signal -wet connector
No action required at present
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
No action required at present
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
No action required at present
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
No action required at present
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
No action required at present
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
Launch delay if out of limits
TBD if within limits but erroneous.
No failure history
P_
Failure
J601-1
& 602-1
O=M
J607
= SMCD
J608
O = SMCD
J609
tZl= SMCD
J701-1
13=SM
Table 4-6 FMEA Summary - Igniters and Sensors (5 of 5)
Description
Fuel Flow Transducer -
Intermittent or no output
LPFTP Shaft Speed
Transducer -
Intermittent or no output
HPFTP Shaft Speed
Transducer -
Intermittent or no output
LPOTP Shaft Speed
Transducer -
Intermittent or no output
Fuel Flowmeter-
Erroneous flowmeter
turbine speed
Crit = 1R
t=S
Crit = 3
t = N/A
Crit = 3,1 R
t = N/A
Crit = 3
t - N/A
Crit = 3,1 R
t=S
Detected by
Fuel Flowmeter
qualification limits.
None at present
HPFTP shaft speed
Ignition confirmed limit.
None at present
HPFTP or HPOTP turbine
temperature redline
limits.
Control System Action
I I
Loss of one channel results in disqualification of that channel.
Loss of both channels precludes mixture ratio control and
the controller initiates electrical Iockup.
No failure history.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only.
No failure history (no CIL entry).
Engine shutdown if no confirmation during Start phase.
Loss of data only during MCD phases.
One failure, 1985; bridge open - Isolated failure.
No action required at present.
Loss of data only.
No failure history.
Engine shutdown if temperatures exceed redline limits.
No failure history.
Exceptions:
330-5MCCLeeJet blocked
Detectedby redundantsensors
Failure IModes
A050-1
A340-1
Failure
Modes
A200-1
A200-2
A200-3
A600-1
A700
A200-5
A600-2
A600-3
A700-2
I A700-3
In 65% to 100% thrust
range
These arrows mean
bypass accommodation
if failure appears severe
Figure 4-1 Combustion Devices
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Figure 4-5 Propellant Valves
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Figure 4-6 Igniters & Sensors
SECTION 5 INVESTIGATION OF SSME START TRANSIENT CONTROL
[
In the current SSME startup, open loop valve control, redline aborts, and closed loop valve
control are used to safely start the engine. Initially, the engine is operated in an open loop
mode with the valves responding to scheduled commands. Proportional and integral thrust
control begins at 2.40 seconds. Proportional and Integral control of the mixture ratio is
initiated at 3.6 seconds.
The valve sequence was developed for a nominal SSME start. For each perturbation about the
nominal engine parameters (e.g. nominal breakaway torques, nominal propellent pressures,
etc.) a slightly different valve sequence would best ensure engine start and mmlrmze damaging
transient effects. To successfully start the SSME requires that engine characteristics are
measured between each flight to ensure nominal values and that external conditions (e.g.
propellent conditions) are tightly controlled.
The SSME start sequence has been developed and refined to the point where the current start
sequence represents a near optimal tradeoff between starting the engine and minimizing engine
damaging transients. There is, therefore, little interest in exploring alternate startup techniques
to improve the nominal startup characteristics.
However, the sequence of engine phenomena (governed by the startup sequence) that
successfully start the engine is highly sensitive to external conditions, such as propellent
temperatures, and to internal engine characteristics, such as turbine breakaway torques.
Relatively minor changes in propellent conditions or engine characteristics result in large
transient events (e.g. temperature spikes) or can inhibit the successful start of an engine. The
sensitivity of the engine startup to external conditions and engine characteristics is attributed to:
1) the highly coupled and non-linear phenomena occuring during startup, and 2) the limited
closed loop control of the engine during startup. In this task, the possibility of reducing
engine startup sensitivities by using additional closed loop control during startup, is
investigated. The desired result of such a control strategy is a more robust and reliable engine
system.
The goal of this task is to explore the means by which closed loop control may be used to
increase the SSME performance and safety during startup and to determine if such closed loop
control is possible. The objectives of additional closed loop control during startup, as part of
the Advanced Functional Framework, include:
- desensitizing the system to engine parameter variations
- desensitizing the system to external perturbations or noise
- improving the system performance by:
- expanding the performance envelope by stabilizing unstable engine modes
- ensuring safe operation nearer the performance envelope boundary
- increasing the engine reliability
- reducing the SSME maintenance costs
Additional closed loop SSME startup control would achieve these advantages by monitoring
and controlling all parameters of the engine which are critical to the performance and health of
the engine. The current state of the SSME is a function of the prior engine state and the fuel
and oxidizer flow rates throughout the engine. Thus, the state of the engine is ultimately
defined by the valves, the original engine state, and engine perturbations. Since the latter two
contributors cannot be directly controlled without modifications to the engine, valve control is
the object of this study.
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This section includes: 1) a description of the current SSME startup sequence, constraints, and
failure history, 2) an overview of the approaches investigated, 3) the conclusions of this
investigation, and 4) recommendations for further study.
5.1 The Current SSME Startup Sequence
5.1.1 Nominal SSME Startup
The current SSME start transient is controlled by opening the engine propellent valves in a
predetermined sequence and providing limited closed loop control. This sequence was
developed and optimized over the course of years with the aid of hundreds of hardware firings
and thousands of simulations. A thorough description of the SSME startup valve commands
and resulting engine responses are described by Bob Biggs, SSME Systems Analysis Project
Engineer, in a paper presented to the American Astronautical Society in 1989 tiffed
Shuttle Main Enone The First Ten Years. The SSME startup as described by Mr. Biggs is
given in the next paragraphs.
When a start command is received, the MFV is immediately ramped to its full open position in
two-thirds of a second (see Figure 5-0). This enables the liquid hydrogen (LH2) to fill the
downstream system and begin to power the high pressure turbines. The latent heat of the
hardware imparts enough energy to the hydrogen to operate as an 'expander-cycle' engine for
the early part of the start sequence. This eliminates the need for any auxiliary power to initiate
the start sequence, however it also creates a thermodynamic instability which is referred to as
the fuel system oscillations. When the cold LH2 begins to flow into the thrust chamber nozzle,
the hardware latent heat causes the hydrogen to expand rapidly, creating a flow blockage and
momentary flow reversal. The result is a pulsating fuel flow rate with an unstable pressure
oscillation at a frequency of approximately 2 Hz. The oscillations continue to increase in
magnitude with dips (reductions in pressure) occuring at approximately 0.25, 0.75, and 1.25
seconds, until the establishment of MCC chamber pressure causes it to stabilize after 1.5
seconds. Events prior to stabilization had to be made to conform to the idiosyncrasies of the
fuel system oscillations.
Simultaneously with the opening of the MFV, electrical power is provided to the spark plugs in
the augmented spark igniters (ASI) included in each of the three combustors. The ASI will
then ignite the combustors when both fuel and oxidizer are present in the proper mixture ratio.
The fuel is provided first by the MFV being opened and then the oxidizer is provided later for
each combustor separately through the three oxidizer valves. Each valve has an ASI liquid
oxygen (LOX) supply line that allows LOX to flow to the ASI upon initial valve motion (about
5 percent). The proper mixture ratio for ignition is achieved by the second dip in pressure
caused by the fuel system oscillations.
After the MFV starts to open, the three oxidizer valves are separately subjected to a series of
position commands intended to precisely control the oxidizer system priming times for the three
combustors. Priming is the process of filling the system with liquid, as with the old hand
cranked water pump. An oxidizer system is said to be 'primed' when it is filled with liquid
down to the combustor such that the flow rate entering the injector is equal to the flow rate
leaving the injector to be burned in the combustor. This event generally results in a rapid rise
in combustion chamber pressure. The target priming times for the three combustors are a tenth
of a second apart; FPB prime at 1.4 seconds, MCC prime at 1.5 seconds, and OPB prime at
1.6 seconds. Although part of the valve positioning is accomplished under a limited form of
closed loop control, it is merely a convenient method of commanding the valves to a
predetermined position and therefore will be treated as if it were all done an open loop
commanded positions as a function of time.
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The first oxidizer valve to be commanded is the FPOV. After a delay of 0.10 seconds, the
FPOV is ramped to 56 percent open at its maximum slew rate. At 0.72 seconds, the FPOV is
given a 'notch' command to close to about 10 percent and then reopen. This is done to
compensate for the second pressure dip caused by the fuel system oscillations and avoid
damaging temperature spikes in the HPFTP turbine. During this dip, the FPB is ign. ited and
and the additional power causes a slight acceleration in the HPFTP speed. Just prior to the
third fuel system oscillation pressure dip, the FPOV is given another notch command which is
maintained throughout the priming sequence.
A safety check is made at 1.25 seconds to ensure that the HPFTP speed is high enough to
safely proceed through the priming sequence. The speed must be high enough at MCC prime
to be able to pump hydrogen through the downstream system against the backpressure rise
created by the MCC prime, or an engine burnout will occur due to the resulting oxygen-rich
combustion. It was determined from test experience that if the speed were to be less than 4600
RPM at 1.25 seconds (Figure 5-0a), then it would likely be too low at MCC prime to maintain
pumping capability. The engine must be shutdown at at 1.25 seconds because, if the speed is
discovered to be too low later in the start sequence, there is insufficient time to react and shut
down safely.
When the FPB prime occurs at 1.4 seconds, there is a rapid rise of pressure at the inlet to the
HPFTP turbine. Since the turbine back pressure is not provided until MCC prime, this
pressure rise causes a high turbine pressure ratio and a significant acceleration in the HPFTP
speed (Figure 5-0b). The higher HPFTP speed is desirable for a cool fuel rich start, however
the turbine back pressure must be applied (MCC prime) soon to prevent a runaway condition.
MCC prime is primarily controlled by positioning of the MOV. After an initial delay of 0.20
seconds, the MOV is slowly ramped to just under 60 percent open. This combination of time
delay, ramp rate, and position provides a LOX flow rate that causes MCC prime to occur at 1.5
seconds and creates an engine system balance that will produce a safe low mixture ratio
(between 3 and 4) for the stabilized operation just prior to activating the closed loop thrust
control system at 2.4 seconds. When MCC prime occurs at 1.5 seconds, it causes a rapid rise
in MCC chamber pressure (Figure 5-0c) which, because it increases the turbine back pressure,
acts as a brake to decelerate the HPFTP (Figure 5-0b).
The OPOV is used to control OPB prime. Its initial opening is after a delay of 0.12 seconds,
however, the opening only retracts the valve inlet seal which is designed to provide sufficient
oxygen to ignite the ASI and to have a small leakage flow into the OPB injector. The valve is
designed so that the major flow path does not start to open until an indicated position of 46
percent. The slow ramp shown in Figure 5-0d has no effect on the OPB LOX flow rate except
to delay until 0.84 seconds when the main flow path through the the valve starts to open. This
flow path is partially open for about a third of a second before it recloses and the OPB is again
run on valve leakage flow. The timing for this opening is scheduled to provide sufficient
oxygen to allow the ASI to ignite the OPB before the second fuel oscillation pressure dip
recovers and causes a significant decrease in mixture ratio. The next opportunity for ignition
would be about half a second later. With valve leakage flow, OPB prime occurs at 1.6 seconds
and causes an increase in drive power to both high pressure turbines. The power increase
stabilizes at about 2 seconds with the MCC chamber pressure at approximately 25 percent of
rated power level (RPL). During this time the chamber coolant valve (CCV), which was full
open at start, is throttled down to 70 percent in order to force additional coolant flow through
the MCC. The engine is allowed to run at this condition until 2.4 seconds to assure stable
operation. The additional time period of 0.4 seconds is to allow for and absorb normal
variations in propellent pressures and temperatures.
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By using the engine mounted sensors, the main engine controller (MEC) verifies proper
ignition and operation of the three combustors at 1.7 seconds and again at 2.3 seconds. If no
malfunctions are discovered the closed loop thrust control system is activated at 2.4 seconds.
The MEC compares the measured MCC chamber pressure to a pre-programmed chamber
pressure ramp to RPL and modulates the OPOV in an attempt to zero out any differences.
During this time, the FPOV is simply moved by the MEC with position changes that are
proportional to the amount of OPOV movement, and the CCV is commanded open at a rate
commensurate with the commanded chamber pressure ramp rate. Because of the the engine
dynamic response characteristics, the resulting chamber pressure lags behind the command by
about 0.2 seconds. At 3.8 seconds the closed loop mixture ratio control system is activated
using the FPOV to adjust fuel flow rate until the commanded mixture ratio is achieved. At 5
seconds the engine has achieved stabilized operation at RPL with a mixture ratio of 6.
A detailed listing of the events that are initiated, monitored, and controlled by the SSME
controller during engine startup is provided as Appendix 4.
5.1.2 SSME Startup Constraints
Certain physical constraints of the SSME startup define the minimal conditions necessary to
safely start the engine and define the boundaries that new control strategies must work within.
These constraints have been identified based on analytical analysis of the SSME, the results of
SSME hot fu'e tests, and the results of early development testing. Each of these constraints,
and failures which have resulted from their violation, are summarized below.
Preburner I_nition Time: The high pressure fuel and oxidizer turbine preburners must ignite
between 0.']5and 0.80 seconds from start-uptoproduce the requiredturbopump acceleration
to achieve satisfactorystartand plateau(thephase during which the engine has settledto an
intermediatelevelpriorto initiationof closed loop MCC pressure controlatt=2.4 seconds)
performance. Ignitiontime isgoverned by the fuelsystem oscillationsand sufficientoxidizer
flow must be availableduring thefuelflow pressuredip forignitionatthistime. Ifignitionis
delayed,thefueldensityand fuelflow increaseas thehardware chillsand theresultingmixture
ratiosand propellantinjectionflow velocitiesarenot properforcomplete and evenly distributed
combustion in the preburners resultingin combustion fluctuationsand local temperature
excursions.
Fuel and Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Flow at Ignition: The preburner oxidizer flow-rates must
be sufficient at ignition time to achieve ignition and ensure total combustion. If partial
combustion occurs, plateau performance is low and ignition of the remaining injection elements
does not take place until the engine is approaching or has already achieved mainstage. This
results in large preburner "pops" (e.g. test 902-081 to 902-084, Engine 0002) and temperature
spikes as the inlet injection elements are ignited which may cause turbine damage (e.g. test
902-068, Engine 0002).
An indication of the oxidizer flow limits can be obtained by examining results of early ignition
tests. For the initial Integrated Subsystem Test Bed (ISTB, early developmental SSME) tests,
the Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve (OPOV) was commanded open at 300 milliseconds after
engine start command with a 200 percent per second (%/see.) ramp rate with satisfactory
preburner ignition. The time at which the OPOV starts to open was subsequently changed to
120 milliseconds after engine start command with no change in preburner ignition time since
fuel side oscillations govern the ignition. On the other hand, on test 901-034, when the OPOV
initial opening ramp was reduced to 100%/see. (starting at 300 milliseconds after the start
command) ignition did not occur.
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Fuel Preburner Priming Time: The fuel prebumer oxidizer manifold must prime between 1.45
and 1.55 seconds (nominal) after engine start command. If the fuel preburner primes early,
fuel flow may be low due to fuel side oscillations, resulting in a high mixture ratio and
overtemperature of the High Pressure Fuel Turbine (HPFT). For example, the FPB primed
early on test 901-178 and 901-179, Engine 0005, with erosion of the HPFT. Prime occurred
at approximately 1.25 seconds after engine start on both of these tests. This time is at the
minimum fuel flow caused by the fuel system oscillations. Delay. of prime to 1.5 (+/- 0.05)
seconds after engine start will result in FPB priming at the maximum fuel flow condition
produced by the fuel system oscillations.
Sequential Order of Combustor Primes: Priming of the SSME combustors must occur in a
specified sequential order to achieve minimum turbine discharge temperatures. The FPB must
prime fu'st, then the main chamber and, finally, the OPB. Priming of the FPB first is required
to ensure continued acceleration of the HPFP during start and to insure that the HPFP speed is
high enough to maintain fuel flow with the increased pump head required at MCC prime. If the
FPB primes too late, i.e., after the MCC has primed, HPFP speed and, consequently, fuel
flow may not be sufficient at prebumer prime to prevent damage to the high pressure turbines.
On test 901-166, Engine 0002, the FPB primed at 1.67 seconds, approximately 100
milliseconds after the main chamber primed. When the fuel preburner did prime (at the same
time as the OPB), HPFP speed was not high enough resulting in a low fuel flow condition
with excessive HPFT and HPOT temperature.
Approximately 100 milliseconds after the FPB primes, the MCC should prime. This time
delay is used to accelerate the HPFP and provide the desired fuel flow margin. At MCC prime,
the HPFT and HPOT pressure ratios are significantly decreased (increasing back pressure) and
the turbopump acceleration slows down. The effect on the HPOP is much greater since the
OPB is not primed and it's acceleration is essentially stopped until OPB prime. The loss of
HPOP acceleration and continued acceleration of the HPFP increases fuel flow to each
preburner. Finally, the OPB prime should occur approximately 100 milliseconds after the
MCC prime. The increased fuel flow and fuel density to the OPB prevents an overtemperature
condition at prime. After prime, the HPOP starts to accelerate until the plateau speed levels are
reached. If the OPB primes too early, fuel flow is not adequate and a HPOT overtemperature
condition will result with turbine damage. On test 901-164, Engine 0002, the OPB primed 30
milliseconds before the MCC. Fuel flow to the OPB was not sufficient at this time and
extensive turbine damage resulted. A similar condition occurred on test 902-107, Engine
0101, with the OPB priming immediately after the MCC. To provide the required fuel flow,
the OPB should prime approximately 100 milliseconds after the main chamber has primed.
MCC Priming Time: The MCC should prime no later then 1.7 seconds after engine start.
Priming of the main chamber results in increasing the fuel system pressure above critical
pressure so that the fuel flow oscillations are terminated. The fuel flow oscillations get bigger
with time and, therefore, MCC prime is required between the second (FPB prime) and third
oscillation. In addition, priming of the MCC increases fuel density so that the effect of the
reduced fuel system pressure drop on flowrate is minimized.
HPFP St_eed at MCC Prime: The HPFP speed should be a minimum of 8000 RPM at MCC
prime. "i_his speed is required so that the reduction in HPFP fuel flow at MCC prime does not
decay below the pump throttle limit line (which may result in boilout). In addition, this speed
level insures adequate fuel flow to each prebumer during the MCC and OPB priming sequence.
T_lrl_opump Speed Ratio: The ratio of HPFP speed to HPOP speed should be a minimum of
1.2 at the time of MCC prime. The increased HPFP speed relative to the HPOP speed results
in increased preburner fuel flow and minimized the possibility of turbine overtemperature. A
speed ratio of 1.04 at MCC prime occurred on test 902-166, Engine 0002, with HPOT
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damage. Ratios of approximately 1.0 to 1.1 have also been experienced on the early OPB
prime tests with HPOT turbine damage. An earlier FPB prime relative to the MCC prime
results in achieving speed ratios in excess of 1.2.
Plateau Mixture Ratio: The engine mixture ratio should be between 3.0 and 4.0 to provide the
desired transition into mainstage. Low plateau mixture ratio caused by poor HPOT
performance also results in low main combustion chamber pressure producing high HPOT
discharge temperatures and/or pressure oscillations during the transition into mainstage.
Mixture ratios above 4.0 may result in a mixture ratio overshoot until the MR loop is closed.
The thrust ramp into mainstage is controlled by the OPOV only with a cross-feed gain to the
FPOV. Therefore if mixture ratio is high on the plateau, this condition could result in an
overshoot in mixture ratio during the upthrust with possible MCC overheating.
[-I_rdware Conditioning: The engine hardware upsteam of the fuel and oxidizer valves must be
pre-conditioned prior to engine start so that all latent heat in excess of propellent temperature
equilibrium is removed. If the oxidizer side hardware is not conditioned properly, the engine
start transients will be slow. The slow start transients cause low HPFP speed at prime and
high turbine discharge temperature (test 901-027, ISTB). If the fuel side hardware is not
conditioned properly, the liquid hydrogen may vaporize causing cavitation of the HPFP and
turbine overtemperature.
5.2 Overview of Proposed Approaches
Several approaches were investigated to evaluate the feasibility and potential benefits of
implementing closed loop control during the SSME startup.
For closed loop control to be successful, the SSME must satisfy three important control
conditions: the SSME must be observable, modelable, and controllable. Observability is the
ability to discern what state the engine is in. Sensors to directly measure the variables
associated with each component are not necessary for observability, if that variable can be
reconstructed from other measurements through observers, models, or filters. However, the
more complete and more accurate the engine measurements, the higher the performance an
engine controller may attain since control actions are taken on reliable and trusted data.
Modelability reflects the degree to which the engine variables making up the desired state vector
can be accurately described. Controllability is, strictly speaking, the ability to control the
engine state to arbitrary values in finite time. However, in this investigation the requirements
for controllability are relaxed to include "improvements" in the engine startup transient.
Therefore the engine is considered controllable if the ability exists to mitigate adverse effects of
external influences, factors inherent to engine startup, or engine anomalies.
Four stages of engine controllability were defined for the SSME startup as shown in Figure 5-
1. Stage 1 begins when the engine start command is received and continues until the engine is
established as a continous system. During stage 1, the engine propellent system (ducts, LOX
domes, etc.) fill with propellent, combustible mixtures are established in the combustion
chambers, the combustible mixtures are ignited, and the high pressure turbopumps begin to
speed up. The goal of the stage 1 start transient is to establish the engine as a continuous
system in a state suitable for the start sequence to continue and to minimize engine damaging
transient affects. The discrete events that are characteristic of stage 1 include the ignition of
propellent gasses in the combustion chambers, the temperature resulting from combustion
chamber ignitions, the timing and sequence of LOX dome primes, the temperatures resulting
from the sudden increase in LOX flow when the domes prime, and the speed of the HPFTP
when the MCC LOX dome primes. The transient nature of stage 1 is indicated by the FPB
temperature as shown in Figure 5-2. Stage 2 begins after the discrete events related to
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establishing the engine as a continuous system.have occured and continues until the thrust
buildup phase of the start sequence (stage 3) is reached.. During stage 2, the engine state is
transitioned to an equilibrium and allowed to "settle out". The goal of the stage 2 start transient
is to transition the engine parameters to a suitable state to enable a safe and reliable thrust
buildup to mainstage values. Stage 3 is the thrust buildup phase of the start transient and is
characterized by the initiation of closed loop control of the MCC pressure in the current SSME
start sequence. Stage 4 starts when the current SSME start sequence initiates closed loop
control of the engine mixture ratio and represents the mainstage control case.
The start transient stage which has the highest potential for improvement by using closed loop
control is stage 1 since the primary engine damaging transients occur during this stage.
Therefore, the efforts of the start transient investigation are concentrated on the stage 1 start
transient. Additionally, some consideration is given to resolving anomalies that occur in stage
2, primarily those resulting from conditions during stage 1. Stages 3 and 4 were not
investigated as part of the start transient investigation since some form of closed loop control is
currently used during these stages of the start sequence.
The SSME is not easily observable or controllable and is not perfectly modeled during the stage
1 start transient. Most engineers in the SSME program, and others who have studied startup
control of the SSME engine, have made this observation. Because of this, SSME experts have
had to rely on test firings to support analytical approaches to determine an acceptable SSME
startup procedure. Therefore, much of the knowledge related to the SSME startup is in the
form of engineering expertise gained through this endeavor. This investigation relies heavily
on that expertise to supplement and clarify the results obtained with the SSME transient model.
Three approaches were investigated for the SSME stage 1 start transient. These are:
a) Extended start sequence
b) Robust nominal sequence - continuous control of critical engine start variables
c) Robust nominal sequence - influence coefficient, model-based valve control
The initial approach for using closed loop control during the stage 1 start transient was to
extend the start sequence and thereby reduce adverse transient effects. The investigation of the
extended start sequence provided no indications that any benefit would be realized and the
approach was abandoned. Within the constraints of the SSME, the nominal start sequence
provides a near optimal trade, off between engine startup reliability and adverse transient effects.
Therefore, the investigation turned to closed loop control approaches that provide a startup that
is more robust to external influences and engine conditions. The first, continuous multiple
input/multiple output control, failed due to a lack of observable/controllable variables during the
SSME start transient. The second approach, an influence model based controller, indicated
some promise and was the most thoroughly investigated approach.
5.2.1 Extended Start Sequence
The initial approach investigated is extending the start sequence while attempting to control
critical SSME startup parameters such as turbine speeds and temperatures. The philosophy is
to smoothly bring the SSME up to mainstage, avoiding severe transient effects inherent to the
current startup. The basic argument for this approach is that the most severe normal start
transient effect is the potentially turbine blade damaging temperature spikes that occur in the
preburner at preburner ignition and when the FPB LOX dome primes (Figure 5-3 to 5-4).
The test data shown in Figure 5-3a indicates an ignition temperature spike of about 80 R.
However, this value is somewhat misleading since: 1) the temperature measured is the fuel
turbine discharge temperature, not the preburner temperature, and 2) the temperature sensor
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used on the engine has a relatively slow time constant. The fuel turbine discharge temperature
is lower than the preburner temperature since the hot gasses generated in the preburner (and
incident on the ftrst stage turbine blades) pass through a labyrinth of relatively cool hardware
before exiting the turbine. Once these cooled gasses exit the turbine, the temperature is
measured with a slow sensor that further attenuates the true reading. Ground tests which
included a preburner temperature sensor indicate a much higher temperature spike than is
indicated by the SSME flight sensors. The SSME system dynamics group evaluated this data
and determined that the true preburner temperature excursion during the ignition spike is about
25 to 27 times greater than that indicated by the HPFT discharge temperature sensors. Using a
conversion factor of 25, the temperature spike shown in Figure 5-3a would be expected to
correspond to a maximum preburner temperature of about 2500R (500 + 25 *80).
Figure 5-3b shows the fuel turbine discharge temperature calculated by the SSME transient
model. The transient model results agree with the actual test data in both magnitude and time of
the ignition spike as indicated by the fuel turbine discharge sensor. The transient model also
provides an estimate of the actual preburner temperature as shown in Figure 5-4. The
calculated fuel preburner temperatures during the ignition spike agree with the maximum value
estimated using SSME test data. The agreement between transient model results and measured
test data provides a degree of confidence that the temperature transients indicated by the
transient model accurately reflect the true SSME FPB temperature transients during startup.
Investigation of the extended start sequence identified two major flaws in the approach: 1) the
transient effects with the current SSME startup that are most critical to engine damage, fuel
preburner temperature spikes, are not reduced, and 2) other potentially damaging transient
effects, most notably sideloading on the engine nozzle, are significantly increased.
Initially, extending the duration of the fuel preburner temperature transients was investigated.
Two fuel preburner temperature spikes, the ignition spike and the priming spike, are indicated
in Figure 5-4. The ignition spike is caused by the ignition of the propellent gasses in the
preburner when an ignitable mixture ratio is reached. The priming spike is caused by the
sudden increase in oxidizer flowrate into the preburner that occurs when the fuel preburner
LOX dome is primed. Both fuel preburner temperature spikes are the result of discrete events,
i.e. ignition and LOX dome priming. The risetime and duration of the temperature spikes are
then governed solely by the physical characteristics of the event. For example, when the
combustable mixture of propeUent gasses is ignited, the only time limitation is the propagation
of the flamefront. Therefore, while modifying the propellent flows in the engine may change
the time at which the fuel preburner ignites and the fuel preburner LOX dome pnmes, the
risefime and duration of the resulting temperature spikes will be unchanged.
Reducing the magnitude of the fuel preburner temperature spikes was then investigated. The
preburner temperature is directly related to the preburner mixture ratio as demonstrated by
comparing the fuel preburner temperature (Figure 5-4) with the fuel preburner mixture ratio
(Figure 5-5). Both the fuel and oxidizer preburners are run very fuel rich and all of the
oxidizer injected into the preburners is burned. Since the fuel/oxidizer combustion is the
source of energy in the combustion gasses, the energy (heat) imparted per unit of combustion
gasses is directly proportional to the ratio of oxidizer to fuel (mixture ratio). No method of
reducing the fuel preburner mixture ratio at ignition or LOX dome prime that was related to
extending the start sequence could be identified.
Therefore, based on the above arguments, it is concluded that extending the engine start
sequence provides no mechanism for reducing the adverse effects of the fuel preburner
temperature spikes.
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rAdditionally, the effect of extending the start sequence on other engine startup transients was
investigated. No additional potential benefits were identified. However, several adverse
effects were noted. The most severe of these are: 1) additional transverse loading of the high
pressure turbopump bearings, 2) additional thermal loading of the MCC, and 3) additional side
loading of the engine nozzle.
Transverse loading of the high pressure turbopump bearings is caused by the vibration of the
turbopump which increases as its speed passes through the turbopump natural frequencies.
Slowly bringing the turbopump up to its mainstage operating speed, which is a requirement for
an extended start sequence, increases the time spent near each natural frequency and
consequently increases the overall turbopump vibrations.
Additional thermal loading of the MCC is caused by lower fuel flowrates during startup.
During startup, the combustion temperature in the MCC is nearly equal to the mainstage
combustion temperature; 5000R at 1.8 seconds compared to a mainstage value of about 6000R.
However, the fuel flowrate during startup is significantly less than the fuel flowrate during
mainstage. Since the fuel flow acts as a coolant for the MCC wall, during startup there is less
available coolant to the MCC walls than during mainstage operation. The disparity between
startup and mainstage conditions is accommodated somewhat by closing the chamber coolant
valve (CCV) and forcing a higher percentage of the available fuel through the MCC coolant
circuit, but the MCC thermal balance is not achieved until mainstage flowrates are reached.
Side loading of the engine nozzle is caused by the turbulent flow conditions that exist in the
nozzle until the engine thrust reaches 80% - 85% of the rated power level (RPL) at sea level.
Even though the engine is at a reduced thrust level, the flowrates and associated forces are still
considerable. The combustion gas flow rate through the nozzle at 80% - 85% of RPL is in
excess of 850 Ibm/see. Nozzle side loading during startup is strikingly indicated during an
SSME ground test or a space shuttle launch. The SSME visibly "jumps" and jerks from side
to side during the startup until the nozzle flow becomes laminar at about 85% of RPL. An
extended start sequence requires that the engine thrust increases to 85% of RPL over a longer
time period than with the current startup resulting in increased nozzle side loading.
The investigation of additional transient effects associated with an extended start sequence,
leads to the conclusion that an extended start sequence is expected to increase the stress levels
of several major engine components - the high pressure turbopumps, the MCC, and the nozzle.
The results of the extended start sequence investigation are threefold:
and
1) No improvement in fuel preburner startup te .mperature transients were identified,
2) No beneficial transient effects on other major engine components were identified,
3) Several adverse transient effects were identified for major engine components.
Therefore, it is concluded that any form of closed loop control designed to extend the SSME
start sequence has no potential to extend engine life, increase engane reliability, or reduce
engine maintenance.
5.2.2 Continous Control of Critical Engine Start Variables
The results of Section 5.2.1 indicate that the nominal SSME start transients cannot be improved
upon within the constraints of the existing SSME configuration. However, the nominal start
transients are extremely sensitive to external influences and engine conditions. For example,
Figure 5-6 shows the expected increase in the fuel preburner ignition temperature spike for
several off-nominal fuel inlet pressures. The FPB ignition spike reaches temperatures of about
RI/RD91-158 PAGE 25
•, .
6500R for fuel inlet pressures significantly less than the nominal 45 psi. Further insight into
the start transient sensitivities is provided in Section 5.1.
An approach to make the current start sequence more robust to external influences and engine
conditions was proposed. The proposed approach was to provide continuous closed loop
control over the engine variables that are critical to successfully starting the engine and the
variables that affect engine damaging transients. Each variable would be controlled to mimic
(or at least approach) the time varying values observed during a nominal startup.
Based on the startup phenomena and constraints described in Section 5.1, the following events
and conditions were identified as critical to a nominal engine startup (the proposed engine
variables to implement the required control are included in parentheses):
1) the
2) the
3) the
4) the
5) the
6) the
time of FPB ignition
(fuel flow rate and oxidizer flow rate into the FPB)
time of OPB ignition
(fuel flow rate and oxidizer flow rate into the OPB)
time of FPB LOX dome prime
(FPB LOX dome oxidizer level)
time of MCC LOX dome prime
(MCC LOX dome oxidizer level)
time of OPB LOX dome prime
(OPB LOX dome oxidizer level)
speed of the HPFTP when the MCC primes
(HPFTP speed)
In addition, the following conditions were identified as critical to minimizing adverse transient
effects:
7) the FPB temperature (mixture ratio) at FPB ignition
(fuel flow rate and oxidizer flow rate into the FPB)
8) the FPB temperature (mixture ratio) when the FPB LOX dome primes
(fuel flow rateand oxidizer flow rate into the FPB)
9) the OPB temperature (mixture ratio) at OPB ignition
(fuel flow rate and oxidizer flow rate into the OPB)
10) the OPB temperature (mixture ratio) when the OPB LOX dome primes
(fuel flow rate and oxidizer flow rate into the OPB)
If the identified engine variables (fuel flowrate into the FPB and OPB, oxidizer flowrate into
the FPB and OPB, the three LOX dome levels, and the HPFTP speed) can be controlled to
replicate the values observed during a nominal startup, then the critical engine startup events
and transients should mimic those of a nominal engine startup.
Problems with continuous closed loop control of the start sequence arise due to the actual
observability and controllability of the proposed variables. Each of the proposed variables is
theoretically observable and controllable. However, measuring or estimating and controlling
some of the variables to the accuracy required for useful engine control is extremely difficult or
impossible within realistic constraints imposed by the SSME configuration (with the exception
of measuring the HPFTP speed).
First consider the fuel flowrate into the FPB and OPB. Observability can be readily achieved
with flowmeters incorporated into the fuel lines leading to each of the preburners. This
statement is based on the premise that a flowmeter can be designed that accurately measures
small gasseous hydrogen flowrates at low pressures and also measures (or at least survives)
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gasseous hydrogen flowrates up to 86 lbm/sec at over 6000 psi during mainstage operation. A
......difficult task, but one that is seemingly realistic. Optical flow measuring techniques exist
(Laser induced pulse/echo techniques) that technically should be able to measure the low level
flowrates if cost and reliability issues are acceptable.
Controllability of the fuel flow into the FPB and OPB is not available with the existing SSME
configuration, but limited control can be achieved with valves incorporated into the fuel lines
leading to each prebumer. Control is limited by the availability of gasseous hydrogen in the
system. The MFV is open to 100% at the beginning of the start transient and fuel flowrates
through the system oscillate as described in Section 5.1. If a pressure dip occurs at a time that
more fuel is required in a prebumer, it may simply not be available no matter how far the
prebumer fuel valve is opened. Theoretically, during start, the fuel path upstream of the
preburner fuel valves can be operated so that the pressure is always above the minimum
required to supply the maximum nominal flowrate to the preburners, but this results in a certain
amount of stagnation in that part of the system. The stagnation causes more of the engine
hardware latent heat to be expended in warming up gasseous hydrogen rather than expanding
liquid hydrogen (the driving force responsible for starting the engine). The feasibility of
providing positive pressure in this manner while extracting sufficient energy from the engine
hardware to power the early start transient is not clear. Therefore, controllability of the fuel
flow into the prebumers is left an open issue.
The amount of oxidizer actually flowing into the FPB and OPB during engine startup is very
difficult, perhaps impossible with the existing SSME configuration, to observe. Liquid
oxygen is introduced into a labyrinth of relatively hot hardware through the LOX dome and
injector assembly. The oxygen boils and some of the oxygen remains in the LOX dome while
some of the oxygen flows through the injector into the preburner. No realistic means of
directly measuring the oxygen fowrate actually entering the preburner could be identified.
Estimating the oxidizer flowrate into the prebumer has difficulties that appear prohibitive.
Reliable models of the oxidizer dome filling and the corresponding oxidizer expulsion into the
preburner are not available and are not likely due to the complexities of the reaction and
sensitivity to a multitude of parameters (LOX temperature, hardware temperature, oxidizer inlet
pressure, preburner backpressure, time history of oxidizer flow into the cavity, engine
orientation, etc.). Therefore, to estimate the oxidizer flowrate into the preburner, the oxidizer
entering the LOX dome and the oxidizer remaining in the LOX dome must be measured.
Measuring the oxidizer fow into the LOX dome requires either a flowmeter downstream of the
preburner oxidizer valve, since some of the oxidizer entering the valve is rerouted to supply
oxidizer to the ASI, or another flowmeter on the ASI line. A flowmeter downstream of the
preburner oxidizer valve introduces additional hot hardware for the oxidizer to encounter. The
preburner oxidizer flowmeter must be able to accurately measure the mass flowrate of two-
phase, boiling, cryogenic oxygen for low flowrates and still measure (or at least survive) liquid
oxygen flow rates up to 79 lbm/sec at 6800 psi during mainstage. It seems unlikely that such a
flowmeter could be designed that meets the engine reliability requirements. The original LOX
flowmeter was removed from the SSME because it presented too great a risk. Even allowing
that such a flowmeter can be designed, severe difficulties still exist with measuring the oxidizer
level in the LOX dome.
The oxidizer flowrate into the preburner is entirely dictated by (and effects) events occuring in
the preburner LOX dome, therefore the oxidizer flowrate into the preburner cannot be
controlled independently from the LOX dome priming event. Additionally, the same
sensitivities that inhibit estimating LOX dome filling inhibit reliable control of the oxidizer
flowrate into the preburner since the only mechanism for getting oxidizer into the prebumer is
through the LOX dome. Therefore, for the purpose of continuous closed loop start sequence
control, the oxidizer flowrate into the preburners lacks the required controllability.
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The LOX dome oxidizer level is not reliably modellable as described above. Therefore, a
means of directly measuring the oxidizer level was considered. It is critical to note that the
oxidizer level that must be measured refers to the amount of liquid oxidizer in the LOX dome
cavity, not the height of the two phase fluid. Therefore, the required measuring device must be
capable of measuring the volume of the LOX dome cavity occupied by liquid oxygen under
boiling conditions. No such device or technique could be identified that is realistic for
application to the LOX dome.
Controllability of the LOX dome filling appear inadequate for continuous closed loop control of
the start sequence by the same arguments that discount controllability of the oxidizer flow into
the prebumer.
HPFTP speed is directly measurable to a high degree of accuracy during the start transient.
However, controllability of the HPFTP speed is not achieved until the fuel prebumer lox dome
primes and enables some degree of control over the amount of energy available to the high
pressure fuel turbine. The lack of controllability until the fuel prebumer LOX dome primes is
shown by Figures 5-7 and 5-8. Figure 5-7 indicates the position of the FPOV during the start
transient. The FPOV is the actuation that most strongly affects the HPFTP speed. Figure 5-8
shows the HPFTP speed during the start transient. Changes in the FPOV position have no
detectable affect on the HPFTP speed until after 1.4 seconds when the fuel preburner LOX
dome primes. After 1.4 seconds, changes in the FPOV position cause noticeable changes in
the HPFTP speed.
Therefore:
1) the fuel flowrate into the preburners is observable and somewhat controllable
2) the oxidizer flowrate into the preburners is not observable and not controllable
3) the LOX dome oxidizer levels are not observable and not controllable
4) the HPFTP speed is observable and controllable
Based on the limited observability and controllability of the identified variables, it was
concluded that closed loop control of the SSME start sequence based on measurement and
control of the critical engine start variables was not feasible.
5.2.3 Influence Model Based Controller
The investigation of continuous control of critical engine start variables, described in Section
5.2.2, indicates that the engine variables that need to be controlled to ensure a safe and reliable
engine startup are inadequately observable and controllable during the stage 1 start transient.
Therefore, any feasible closed loop control strategy for the stage 1 start transient cannot rely on
observation and control of the engine variables primarily responsible for the start transient
phenomena described in Section 5.2.2. Therefore, a control strategy based on relating only
observable variables to the stage 1 start transient phenomena was investigated. The selected
approach to implementing the control strate.gy was to base the start transient control on the
influence that observable external factors, engine conditions, and control variables are expected
to have on the start phenomena - an influence model. The control strategy investigated is to
quantify the influence of external factors and engine conditions, combine the individual
influences of each factor and condition, and then determine changes in the engine control
variables that offset the non-control influences.
A simple example of the influence model based control strategy is brewing a pot of coffee
using an automatic drip coffee maker. Assume 3 scoops of coffee grounds and 10 cups of
water produce the nominal pot of coffee. Further assume that 8 cups of nominal coffee are
required for a given purpose. The "correct" amount of coffee grounds for the off-nominal
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amount of water is estimated by an operator that has used the machine before and knows that 2
cups less water requires 1/2 scoop fewer coffee grounds. The relationship between cups of
water and scoops of coffee is a simple influence model. The external factor (2 cups less water)
is observed, the expected influence (strong coffee) is estimated, and the control response (1/2
scoop fewer coffee grounds) to offset the external influence is implemented. It is important to
note that the operator generally has little knowledge of the chemistry associated with brewing
coffee or even the events occuring within the coffee maker and is still able to control the coffee
state (temperature, taste) to near nominal, for a variety of water levels. It is equally important
to note that if the coffee maker has an unobservable failure (e.g. heating coil burns out) the
resultant coffee state will be far from nominal (cold). Additionally, if asked to make 1 cup of
coffee, the amount of coffee grounds used by the operator (based on an influence model
developed around a nominal 10 cup water level) is likely to be far from the "correct" value.
The example used above illustrates three important features of an influence model: 1) a useful
model can be developed without observation or complete understanding of the interactions that
relate the external influence to the desired output, 2) unobservable anomalies are not accounted
for, and 3) the model is useful only over the range of observed (or simulated) influences used
to develop the model. Generally, for a complex system, the observed influences consist of
limited perturbations to the nominal system. To explore all combinations of external influences
and internal conditions is not feasible because of the large number of off-nominal combinations
that must be considered. Therefore, practical influence models are limited to perturbations
around a nominal system.
For the SSME stage 1 start transient, the influence model is a model of the start transient in
which the influence of external factors (e.g. propellent inlet pressures), engine conditions (e.g.
high pressure turbine torques), and control variables (e.g. FPOV position) on the controlled
engine phenomena are characterized by observation and simulation.
Investigation of the influence model based control strategy consisted of 1) identifying stage 1
start transient phenomena to be controlled, 2) evaluating the controllability of the selected
phenomena, 3) developing a limited influence model for the SSME start transient, 4) simulating
an anomaly in an external influence (low fuel inlet pressure), and 5) simulating an anomaly in
an internal engine condition (MOV error)
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5.2.3.1 Stage 1 Start Transient Control Phenomena
The stage 1 start transient phenomena selected as control parameters are those identified in
Section 5.2.2 as critical to a safe and reliable engine startup
The critical stage I start transient phenomena (as described in Section 5.1) were identified as:
1) the time of FPB ignition
2) the time of OPB ignition
3) the time ofFPB LOX dome prime
4) the time of MCC LOX dome prime
5) the time of OPB LOX dome prime
6) the speed of the HPFTP when the MCC primes
7) the FPB temperature at FPB ignition
8) the FPB temperature when the FPB LOX dome primes
9) the OPB temperature at OPB ignition
10) the OPB temperature when the OPB LOX dome primes
5.2.3.2 Controllability and the Influence Model
The SSME digital transient model was used to evaluate several off-nominal FPOV and OPOV
start sequences. The results of this evaluation were used to assess the controllability of the
selected start transient phenomena. Additionally, the results were used to develop a limited
influence model for the stage 1 start transient. The limitations on the influence model are: 1)
only the FPOV and OPOV are used as control valves, 2) no multiple influences were
investigated, and 3) influences were quantified only over a limited range around the nominal
engine state. The limitations result from the desire to limit the number of simulation runs and
the inability (within the scope of this effort) to modify the SSME digital transient model. No
fundamental limit exists on the capability to develop a comprehensive influence model for the
stage I start transient.
Four test cases were run: 1) a positive offset in the FPOV flow area [approx. 0.003 in2], 2) a
positive offset in the OPOV flow area [approx. 0.002 in2], 3) a positive offset in the first
FPOV notch time [+0.05 seconds], and 4) a negative offset in the FPOV first notch time [ -
0.10 seconds].
The FPOV and OPOV flow area offsets are shown in Figures 5-9 and 5-10. The offsets were
implemented by increases the valve leakage value in the digital transient model and are labeled
as "FPOV leak" and "OPOV leak" in the subsequent data plots. The relevant digital transient
model data resulting from the FPOV and OPOV flow area offsets is shown in Figure 5-11.
Changes in critical start transient phenomena resulting from the FPOV and OPOV flow area
offsets are listed in Table 5-1. Table 5-1 lists the nominal value for each phenomena in the
"Nominal" column and lists the changes from nominal in the "FPOV" and "OPOV" columns.
The FPB ignition time is measured as the time that the main spike of the first temperature
transient occurs in the fuel preburner (Figure 5-11d). The OPB ignition time is measured as
the time that the main spike of the first temperature transient occurs in the oxidizer preburner
(Figure 5-11b). The FPB prime time is measured as the time when the fuel preburner pressure
begins to rise rapidly (Figure 5-1 lc). The OPB prime time is measured as the time when the
oxidizer preburner pressure begins to rise rapidly (Figure 5-1 la). The MCC prime time is
measured as the time when the main combustion chamber pressure begins to rise rapidly
(Figure 5-1 lf). The HPFTP speed at the first plateau is measured where the HPOTP speed
levels out after MCC prime (Figure 5-1 le). The FPB temperature at ignition is measured as the
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maximumtemperaturereached during the first fuel preburner temperature transient (Fi .gure 5-
l ld). The FPB temperature at FPB LOX dome prime is measured as the maximum
temperature reached during the second fuel preburner temperature transient (Figure 5-1 ld).
The OPB temperature at ignition is measured as the maximum temperature reached during the
first oxidizer preburner temperature transient (Figure 5-11b). The OPB temperature at OPB
LOX dome prime is measured as the maximum temperature reached during the second oxidizer
preburner temperature transient (Figure 5-1 lb)
The offsets in the first FPOV notch time are shown in Figure 5-12. Changes in critical start
transient phenomena resulting from the offset first FPOV notch time are listed in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2 lists the nominal value for each phenomena in the "Nominal" column and lists the
changes from nominal in the "0.60" and "0.75" columns. The complete set of digital transient
model data plots for each case is provided in the appendices. Appendix 1 contains the nominal
simulation. Appendix 2 contains the data plots for an FPOV first notch time of 0.60 seconds.
Appendix 3 contains the data plots for an FPOV notch time of 0.75 seconds. The data
summarized in Table 5-2 was measured from the data plots in the appendices in the manner
described for the offset FPOV and OPOV flow area simulations.
The digital transient model indicates that each of the selected start transient phenomena is
controllable. Furthermore, the data summarized in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 define a simple
influence model for the stage 1 start transient. The influence on controlled phenomena (FPB
ignition, FPB prime time, etc.) by control variables (OPOV and FPOV position/time) are
clearly defined for a limited rage of control options.
5.2.3.3 Simulation of a Low Fuel Inlet Pressure Anomaly
The nominal fuel inlet pressure during SSME startup is 45 psi, with an allowable window of
43 to 47 psi for successful SSME startup. The stage 1 and 2 start transient was simulated with
the digital transient model using a fuel inlet pressure of 42 psi to represent a degrading external
influence on the start transient. The most notable and potentially damaging anomaly in the
engine is a large increase in the magnitude of the FPB ignition temperature transient (Figure 5-
13c).
If the influence model were completed, the fuel inlet pressure (an external factor) would be
measured and the corresponding start transient influence would be estimated as a 2400 R
increase in the FPB ignition temperature. Then an offsetting control action would be
determined. In this case, the anomaly was manually evaluated and determined to be a 2400 R
increase in the magnitude of the FPB ignition temperature. As indicated by the influence data
shown in Table 5-1, an increase of 0.003 in 2 in the FPOV flow area is expected to result in a
100 R increase in FPB ignition temperature. The ratio of delta FPOV flow area to delta FPB
ignition temperature results in an influence coefficient of 0.00003 in2/R. Therefore, the
influence data indicates that a reduction in valve area of 0.072 in 2 is required to reduce the FPB
ignition temperature to its nominal value. By manually evaluating the start transient anomalies
and using the influence data to estimate effective control actions, the influence model based
control strategy is replicated.
Figure 13 shows the data plots from three digital transient model runs: 1) the nominal case -
fuel inlet pressure of 45 psi, 2) the anomalous case - fuel inlet pressure of 42 psi, and 3) the
anomalous case with a modified valve sequence.
Figure 5-14 summarizes the digital transient data by providing bar graphs of the selected start
transient phenomena for the nominal simulation, simulation with a fuel inlet pressure of 42 psi,
and the simulation with a fuel inlet pressure of 42 psi and a modified valve sequence.
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Figures 5-13 and 5-14 indicate that the FPB ignition temperature is the only.start phenomena to
significantly differ from the nominal case when the fuel inlet pressure is reduced and the
original start sequence is used. A FPB ignition temperature of 4800 R is indicated. When the
control action determined manually from the influence data is incorporated into the simulation,
the simulation shows a decrease in the FPB ignition temperature from 4800 R to about 2700 R.
The decrease in FPB ignition temperature is close to that estimated with the influence data.
However, severe transient affects were generated in other start transient phenomena by the
control action as shown in Figure 5-14.
The simulation of the influence model based control strategy seems worse than the open loop
case. However, the anomaly upon which the control action was based is significantly
improved. These facts indicate that the influence model based control strategy has the potential
to reduce stage 1 start transient anomalies, but requires a more extensive influence model to be
effective.
5.2.3.4 Simulation of a Main Oxidizer Valve Anomaly
The digital transient model was used to simulate an anomalous engine condition, a misaligned
main oxidizer valve (MOV). The valve resistance was changed in the model so that at a
position of 60% open the valve resistance was equivalent to a normal MOV at 55% open.
Additionally, a simulation was run with the misaligned MOV and an influence model based
control strategy employed.
For the influence model based control strategy used to determine the modified start sequence in
the final simulation the following parameters are relevant:
1) The observable engine condition is the oxidizer system effective resistance (OSER) defined
as:
Oxidizer System (OSER) =
Effective Resistance
High Pressure Oxidizer Discharge Pressure
(Oxidizer Flow) 2
2) The start transient phenomenon to be addressed is the HPFTP speed at MCC LOX dome
prime time.
3) The control action considered is a change in the MOV position.
The control strategy consists of measuring the amount that the OSER is away from nominal,
estimating the affect the off-nominal value of OSER will have on the HPFTP speed when the
MCC LOX dome primes, and determining the change in MOV position required to counteract
the estimated HPFTP speed anomaly.
i •
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Theinfluencecoefficients were defined from the simulation results as:
A HPFTP Speed at MCC LOX Dome Prime 300 RPM
Influence Coefficient (1) = .................................................... = .............. = -7500
A OSER - 0.04
A MOV Position + 5%
Influence Coefficient (2) - ................................................. - .............. = -0.0167
A HPFTP Speed at MCC LOX Dome Prime -300 RPM
Figure 15 shows the data plots from three digital transient model runs: 1) the nominal case, 2)
the anomalous case - MOV misaligned, and 3) the anomalous case with a modified valve
sequence.
Figure 5-14 summarizes the digital transient data by providing bar graphs of the selected start
transient phenomena for the nominal simulation, simulation with misaligned MOV, and the
simulation with a misaligned MOV and a modified valve sequence.
The results indicate that the HPFTP speed when the MCC LOX dome primes is much closer to
the nominal value of 14500 RPM in the controlled case than in the open loop case (Figure 5-
150.
5.2.3.5 Summary of Influence Model Controller Investigation
The fuel inlet pressure anomaly and the MOV anomaly simulations indicate that the control
strategy is effective at bringing single start transient phenomena closer to their nominal values
under anomalous conditions. However, other aspects of the start sequence were significantly
degraded during the low fuel inlet pressure anomaly.
The study was performed as a feasibility demonstration and only single start transient
phenomena were considered in evaluating a control response using only a specific valve. To
fully evaluate the utility of the influence model based control strategy, a complete influence
model needs to be developed that evaluates the influence on all of the start phenomena when
determining the control response and determines the response for all of the control valves.
5.3 Conclusions of The Closed Loop Start Sequence Investigation
It appears that any form of control designed to slow down the SSME start sequence has no
potential to extend engine life, increase engine reliability, or reduce engine maintenance.
Investigation of extending the duration of the start sequence shows no improvement in fuel
preburner startup temperature transients, no beneficial transient effects on other major engine
components,an increase in MCC thermal loading, an increase in transverse loading of the high
pressure turbopump beatings, and an increase in nozzle side loading.
Continuous control of the engine critical start variables during the early start sequence (0.0 to
1.6 seconds) is not feasible because the critical engine variables (ignitions, priming, flowrates)
have limited observability and controllability during this period.
Closed loop control based on an influence model appears to hold some potential for improving
the robustness of the current start sequence. Simulations with limited influence models resolve
single transient anomalies but seem to cause larger anomalies elsewhere in the start sequence.
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A full influencemodelthattakesintoaccountall of the critical startup events and evaluates the
influence of each valve is required for a more thorough evaluation.
5.4 Recommendations for Further Study
Two areas for further study are suggested by the results of the investigation performed under
this contract.
1. Development and evaluation of a full influence model for control of the early start sequence.
2. Evaluation of a modified engine in which observability and controllability of critical start
transient variables is possible. The limitation with the current engine confi .g.m'ation seems to be
the time before the LOX domes prime, it is therefore recommended that an investigation along
this path include simulation of an engine in which the oxidizer system is fully primed prior to
initiating engine start.
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Table 5-1 Start Transient Changes for Offsets in FPOV and OPOV
Flow Areas
Change in Flow Area
FPB Ignition Time, @ Main Spike (seconds)
OPB Ignition Time, @ Main Spike (seconds)
FPB Prime Time (seconds)
OPB Prime Time (seconds)
MCC Prime Time (seconds)
HPFTP Speed @ Plateau (RPM)
FPB Temperature, Maximum @ FPB Ignition (°R)
FPB Temperature, Maximum @ FPB Prime °R)
OPB Temperature, Maximum @ OPB Ignition (°R)
OPB Temperature, Maximum @ OPB Prime (°R)
i
l
None
(nominal)
0.73
1.0
1.41
1.70
1.48
14500
240O
22OO
76O
630
FPOV OPOV
0 0
0 0
-0.02 -0.02
-0.04 -0.09
0 -0.01
+500 +100
+100 0
+100 0
-20 +240
0 +70
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Table 5-2 Start Transient Changes for Changes in FPOV Notch Time
1st FPOV Notch Time (seconds)
FPB Ignition Time, @ Main Spike (seconds)
OPB Ignition Time, @ Main Spike (seconds)
FPB Prime Time (seconds)
OPB Prime Time (seconds)
MCC Prime Time (seconds)
HPFTP Speed @ Plateau (RPM)
FPB Temperature, Maximum @ FPB Ignition (°R)
FPB Temperature, Maximum @ FPB Prime (°R)
OPB Temperature, Maximum @ OPB.Ignition (°R)
OPB Temperature, Maximum @ OPB Prime (°R)
0.70 ..(nom,naij
0.73
1.0
1.40
1.65
1.47
14500
2400
2200
72O
58O
0.60
-0.03
+0.03
+0.02
+0.03
-0.05
-500
-2OO
-350
+200
0
0.75
+0.01
0
-0.02
+0.01
+0.01
+200
+200
-1150
-60
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SECTION 6 ICS FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK SIMULATION
The objective of the ICS functional framework simulations is to demonstrate the feasibility, of
key features of the framework. Key features demonstrated are: 1) the ability to control engine
variables other than thrust and mixture ratio while maintaining a specified thrust and mixture
ratio, 2) the ability to rapidly and smoothly change engine variables using a multivariable
controller, and 3) the ability to coordinate a three engine cluster using downthrust factors as
feedback. Similiar rocket engine control objectives have been demonstrated by NASA-LeRC
and are presented in Reference 2. Since the goal of the simulation effort is to demonstrate
feasibility, no effort to optimize the control gains was expended beyond that required to
demonstrate the control feasibility.
The MATRIXx simulation environment was selected for this effort since a detailed simulation
of the SSME dynamics was available in this environment. The detailed SSME dynamic model
used in this effort was implemented in MATRIXx by NASA-LeRC based on equations
provided by Rocketdyne and was made available by NASA-LeRC for this program.
The general control strategy employed in the ICS framework consists of a propulsion level
controller and three engine level controllers. The propulsion level controller implements thrust
control over the three engine cluster. The engine level controller implements additional engine
variable control within the constraints set by the propulsion level controller.
The engine level controller is simulated to demonstrate the feasibility of controlling engine
variables to desired values while maintaining mission thrust and mixture ratio constraints.
Initially, a non-interacting multiple input controller is implemented as a proof of concept. Then
the relationships between relevant engine variables is defined and an interacting multiple
input/multiple output controller is implemented. Finally, the engine thrust and downthrust
factor responses are characterized to define a simplified engine model.
The propulsion level controller simulation uses three simplified engine models to demonstrate
thrust distribution between the engines in response to degradations as indicated by the
downthrust factor. Several demonstration cases are run and an actual SSME failure case is
simulated.
6.1 Engine Level Controller Simulations
6.1.1 Engine Level Simulation Overview and Goals
The goal of the ICS engine level controller simulation is to demonstrate the feasibility of
controlling potentially degrading engine variables while maintaining mission requirements for
engine thrust and engine mixture ratio.
To simplify the problem, only the fuel preburner oxidizer valve (FPOV), the oxidizer preburner
oxidizer valve (OPOV), and the oxidizer preburner fuel valve (OPFV) were considered as
control valves throughout the simulation. The FPOV and OPOV are currently used on the
SSME and the OPFV is an additional valve proposed as part of the phase I ICS baseline
functional framework that controls the distribution of fuel between the high pressure turbines.
Additionally, only the thrust command is set by the propulsion level controller. The mixture
ratio is controlled to a fLxed value of 6.0.
The potentially degrading engine variables selected for control are the high pressure fuel turbine
(HPFT) temperature and the high pressure oxidizer turbine (HPOT) temperature. The high
pressure turbines are currently run at temperatures near the damage limits (redlines) during
SSME mainstage operation. The HPFr temperature is especially high and contributes to the
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life limits of turbine components such as turbine blades. The control strategy implemented is to
force the ratio turbine temperature/temperature redline (T/R) to be equal for both high pressure
turbines. The rationale for forcing T/Rs to equal values is:
1) The temperature redline value for each turbine indicates the temperature at which the damage
rate is so great that the engine is expected to fail before mission completion.
2) The damage rate is estimated to be directly related to turbine temperature.
3) The relative damage rate for each turbine is therefore estimated as turbine temperature /
temperature redline (T/R).
4) For a given set of engine fuel and oxidizer flowrates, the high pressure turbine temperatures
are inversely related.
5) The goal of the controller is to maximize total engine life.
6) Total engine life is maximized when the damage rates for the high pressure turbines are
equal.
(i.e. HPFT temperature/HPFT redline = HPOT temperature/HPOT redline)
The overview of the ICS engine level controller simulations is shown in Figure 6-1. The thrust
level command (from the ICS propulsion level controller) and the mixture ratio command
(fixed at 6.0) are converted into engine variable commands (fuel and oxidizer flowrates) that
can be implemented by a combination of the FPOV, OPOV, and OPFV positions. Valve
commands are issued that resolve errors in the commanded fuel and oxidizer flowrate while
forcing the high pressure turbine T/Rs to be equal. Additionally, the main combustion chamber
(MCC) pressure and the HPFT temperature/redline ratio are fed back to the propulsion level
controller. The MCC pressure is used to estimate engine thrust and the HPFT
temperature/redline ratio provides a simplified downthrust factor. The simulated functions
represent the Engine Command Genererator, the Primary Actuator Command Generator, and
the high pressure turbine temperature function of the Engine Coordinator shown in Figure 3-
la. The propellent flowrates are used as the controlled variables at the engine level to reflect
the RREICS framework philosophy of controlling each propulsion subsystem independently to
meet the overall propulsion system requirements. Even though controlling the propellent feed
system flowrates (instead of controlling thrust and mixture ratio directly) has little meaning in
the case of the SSME, the applicability of controlling the propellent feed system to an integrated
propulsion system warrants the additional effort.
6.1.2 Non-Interacting Multiple Input Control
The first simulation objective is a proof of concept of the ICS engine level control objectives
for the SSME with the addition of the OPFV. The specific goals of the proof of concept
simulation are to show that: 1) the high pressure turbine temperatures can be controlled to equal
values of T/R and 2) the fuel and oxidizer flowrates can be maintained at the commanded
values.
Figure 6-2a shows the proof of concept simulation layout. The superblock labeled "ssme" is
the detailed ssme model and represents the dynamics of the engine and valves. The superblock
labeled "e2" is the valve controller. External inputs to the simulation are the commanded
engine fuel flowrate and the commanded oxidizer flowrate. Unity feedback of the simulated
propellent flowrates is used to calculate the fuel flowrate error (Mf_ERROR) and the oxidizer
flowrate error (Mo_ERROR). The temperature error is calculated as the difference between the
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HPFT andthe HPOT temperaturesnormalizedby the inverseof thecorrespondingredline
values(1905Rfor theHPFT, 1760Rfor theHPOT).
The valve controller is a non-interactingmultiple input controller that consistsof three
independentcontrol loops. The FPOV is commandedbasedon fuel flowrate errors. The
OPOVis commandedbasedonoxidizer flowrate errors. TheOPFVis commandedbasedon
turbinetemperatureerrors. Integralcontrol is usedfor eachvalve control loop. The gainof
eachcontrolloopis thesensitivityof thecontrolledparameterto thecontrolvalveasdetermined
by baselinesimulationruns.
Inputs to the proof of concept simulation are a constant 148 Ibm/second for the engine fuel
flowrate and a constant 893 Ibm/second for the engine oxidizer flowrate. The input values
represent the propellent flowrates required to achieve 100% of rated power level (RPL) for the
SSME.
The results of the simulation are shown in Figures 6-2c, 6-2d, and 6-2e. Initial oscillations in
the data are attributed to anomalies caused by initialization of the simulation and are not
considered "real" data. Therefore, interpretation of the simulation results begins after the initial
oscillations have settled out. Figure 6-2c shows that the temperature error was forced to 0.0 as
expected. Figure 6-2d shows the commanded engine fuel flowrate (solid line) and the actual
fuel flowrate (dashed line). The actual fuel flowrate oscillates around the commanded value
and appears to be settling to the commanded value. Figure 6-2e shows the commanded engine
oxidizer flowrate (solid line) and the actual oxidizer flowrate (dashed line). The actual oxidizer
flowrate oscillates around the commanded value and appears to be settling to the commanded
value.
With the proof of concept controller, the HPFT temperature reached a steady state value of
about 1720R (T/R - 0.903) and the HPOT temperature reached a steady state value of about
1600R (T/R = 0.909) for a simulated 100% RPL. With the baseline SSME controller, the
HPFT temperature at 100% RPL would be about 1810R (T/R = 0.95) and the HPOT
temperature at 100% RPL would be about 1370R (T/R = 0.78). The engine life limiting
damage rate is reduced from 0.95 for the baseline SSME to 0.90 for the SSME with the ICS
control strategy.
Based on the proof of concept simulation, it appears that the high pressure turbine temperatures
can be controlled while maintaining the commanded propellent flowrates using the SSME with
the addition of an OPFV.
6.1.3 Interacting Multiple Input/Multiple Output Controller
The non-interacting multiple input controller implemented and described in Section 6.1.2
demonstrated the feasibility of the ICS engine level control strategy. Specifically, it was
demonstrated that potentially damaging engine variables can be controlled within the constraints
of mission thrust and mixture ratio constraints. However, the simple control scheme used in
the proof of concept demonstration shows a slow response (the flowrates oscillate with a
period of about 10 seconds) and a long settling time (the flowrate have not settled after 10
seconds). To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed engine level control strategy for a real
life application it is necessary to demonstrate that suitable engine responses to commanded
inputs can be achieved. Therefore, a better (faster, less overshoot) engine response is
implemented using a multivariable controller.
The first step in the interacting multiple input/multiple output controller development is to
characterize the sensitivity of each controlled engine variable to each of the control valves. The
sensitivities are determined using multiple simulation runs and the resulting data is used to
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defineagainmatrix thatis implementedin thevalve controller. The new valve controller is
incorporated into the engine level controller model and a baseline control case is simulated.
6.1.3.1 Determination of the Gain Matrix
The relationship between the relevant SSME variables and the control valve positions was
determined to facilitate implementation of an interacting multiple input/multiple output
controller. The objective of this effort is to determine the relative changes in control valve
positions required to resolve a measured error vector. The control valves investigated are the
OPOV, FPOV, and OPFV. The SSME variables investigated are the engine fuel fiowrate, the
engine oxidizer flowrate, the HPFT temperature, and the HPOT temperature. Additionally,
changes in the normalized turbine temperature difference were calculated by taking the
difference between the HPFT temperature divided by the HPFT redline temperature (1905R)
and the HPOT temperature divided by the HPOT redline temperature (1760R) as shown below:
T = T_HPFT/1905- T_HPOT/1760, = Temperature Error
The sensitivity of each SSME variable to changes in control valve positions was determined for
control valve perturbations around a 100% RPL nominal value. Seven simulation runs were
generated and the relevant parameter values recorded. The results of the simulations are
summarized in Table 6-1. The first column indicates the engine variables for the nominal
100% RPL. The remaining six columns show the engine variables for perturbations in a single
valve position. The FPOV, OPOV, and OPFV were each perturbed by +/- 1% of the nominal
value. Table 6-2 shows the valve to variable gains obtained by taking the difference between
the +1% values and the -1% values.
Based on the simulation results, the engine response linearized around 100% RPL is
represented by"
S = A x V, where
dMf
S = dMo, error vector
dT
A
175.6 149.2 1.26
-428.2 2508 78.4
6.33 -6.40 0.39
dP_FPOV
V - dP_OPOV, changes in valve position
dP_OPFV
!'
To determine the relative changes in valve positions to resolve a measured error vector, the
engine response equation is solved for V.
-1
V = A x S, where
-1 0.005 -0.0002 0.031
A - 0.002 0.0002 -0.053
-0.026 0.004 1.88
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6.1.3.2 Interacting Multiple Input/Multiple Output Controller Simulation and
Results
The interacting multiple input/multiple output controller simulation has the same top level
architecture as described in Section 6.1.2 and shown in Figure 6-2a. The difference is in the
valve controller. The superblock labeled "e2" (the valve controller) is replaced with the valve
controller shown in Figure 6-3a. The proportional gains correspond to the gain matrix A-1
described in Section 6.1.3.1. The integral gains are set to reduce the steady state error but are
not optimized in any way.
The input to the simulation is initially a fuel flowrate command = 148 lbm/sec and an oxidizer
flowrate command = 888 lbm/sec. At time = 1 second, a commanded step change to fuel
flowrate command = 140 lbm/sec and oxidizer flowrate command to 840 lbm/sec is issued. At
time = 2 seconds, a commanded step change back to the initial commanded values is issued.
The input commands maintain a mixture ratio of 6.0 throughout the simulation and command
the thrust from a nominal 100% RPL to about 94% RPL and back to 100% RPL.
The simulated thrust and downthrust factor for the interacting multiple input/multiple output
controller using the input commands described above are shown in Figure 6-3b. The engine
thrust settles to within 1/2 of a percent in about 0.15 seconds. The downthrust factor indicates
some overshoot, but settles to steady state in about 0.15 seconds. Figures 6-3c and 6-3d
show the propellent flowrate responses to the step inputs. Figure 6-3e shows the turbine
temperature to redline temperature ratio for the HPFT and the HPOT. Figure 6-3e indicates a
maximum HPFT temperature overshoot of about 75 R during the upthrust transient.
The interacting multiple input/multiple output controller (without gain optimization) simulation
indicates that: 1) the HPOT and HPFT temperatures are controlled to the same value of T/R
throughout the test, and 2) a thrust change rate of 40%/second is achieved. The interacting
multiple input/multiple output controller simulation indicates an engine response 4 times faster
than the current SSME which is thrust change rate limited to 10%/second. Therefore, the
simulated controller results in an engine response that appears to exceed the requirements for a
real life application and the feasibility of controlling the high pressure turbine temperatures
while maintaining the thrust and mixture ratio at mission required values is demonstrated.
6.2 Propulsion Level Controller Simulations
6.2.1 Propulsion Level Simulation Overview and Goals
The ICS propulsion level controller controls the thrust and mixture ratio of each engine to
achieve overall propulsion system thrust and mixture ratio commands issued by the ICS
controller. The goal of the ICS propulsion level controller is to implement the overall
propulsion system thrust and mixture ratio while maximizing the reliability, life, and
performance of the engine cluster.
The objective of the ICS propulsion level controller simulation is to demonstrate that individual
engine thrust values can be controlled to maximize engine cluster reliability, life, and
performance (as indicated by the downthrust factor) within mission and engine constraints.
The ICS propulsion level controller simulation consists of three engine models and a single
propulsion level controller that determines the thrust of each engine. The control objectives
implemented in the ICS propulsion level simulation are:
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1) The overall propulsion system thrust equals the mission level controller command
2) Individual engines are operated within an allowable operating range (65% to 109%)
3) The individual engine downthrust factors are equal
The first control objective is a requirement for mission completion. The second control
objective is a requirement of the engine system. Implementation of the third control objective
results in a thrust distribution between engines that extends the useful life of the weakest
engine.
The first step in the simulation effort was to define a first order engine model to facilitate
simulation of the ICS propulsion level controller. The fast order engine model provides thrust
and downthust factor feedback to the ICS propulsion level controller.
The ICS propulsion level controller is implemented both in MatrixX and coded for use on an
IBM PC using the Basic language. The PC version of the simulation includes features that
could not be readily implemented in MatrixX within the time frame of this contract.
Three simulation cases (one using MatrixX and two using the PC) are presented to demonstrate
the functions of the ICS propulsion level controller. Then a real SSME failure case is
simulated and the engine cluster response using the ICS propulsion level controller is
presented.
Finally, the detailed SSME dynamic model is integrated with the ICS propulsion level
controller simulation in MatrixX.
6.2.2 Definition and Characterization of First Order Engine Model
The first order engine model is a greatly simplified model of the SSME that was used to
provide the feedback necessary to demonstrate the propulsion level controller. Two engine
feedbacks are required for the ICS propulsion level controller simulation, the engine thrust and
the downthrust factor. Therefore, the f'ast order model need only provide realistic indications
of the thrust time response and the downthrust factor time response.
The first order engine model approximates the SSME response to thrust commands as a first
order response with a time constant of 0.1 seconds. For simplicity and for the clarity of
propulsion level controller responses, higher order effects and non-linearities were not included
in the first order engine model. The time constant of 0.1 seconds is representative of the
response demonstrated by the detailed engine simulations described in Section 6.1.3.2
The first order engine model approximates the downthrust factor as a function of thrust. In
order to define the downthrust factor equation, the downthrust factor is represented by the hi.gh
pressure fuel turbine temperature/redline ratio. HPFT T/R it is expected to be a major
contributor to the overall downthrust factor in any ICS.
The downthrust factor function was quantified by forcing the detailed engine model to thrust
values ranging from 100% RPL to 65% RPL and recording the HPFT T/R as shown in Figure
6-4. The downthrust factor oscillations at the lower thrust levels indicate that the detailed
engine model is being overcontrolled. The reason for the overcontrol is that the gain matrix
was derived for the controller around 100% and the valve response is not linear. The
downthrust factor at the lower thrust levels was estimated as the mean value for those levels.
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The detailed engine model downthrust factor was curve fit as a function of thrust to define the
first order engine model downthmst factor function. The data fit a linear relationship well with
the resulting equation being given by:
Downthrust factor = le-06 * Thrust + 0.43 [6-1]
r
x
6.2.3 The Propulsion Level Controller Simulation
The ICS propulsion level controller strategy is described by the MatrixX version of the
propulsion level controller simulation shown in Figure 6-5. The superblocks labeled "ideal_2"
are the fwst order engine models described in Section 6.2.2. The superblock labeled "ideal_3"
is the first order engine model with an engine degradation simulated. Input "1" is the
propulsion system thrust command from the mission level controller.
In the outer control loop, the sum of engine thrusts is fed back to the ICS propulsion level
controller and compared to the commanded propulsion level thrust to create a propulsion
system thrust error. The engine thrusts are controlled using the propulsion system thrust error
through a proportional-integral controller.
The inner loop modifies the outer loop thrust commands in response to variations in the engine
downthrust factors. The average of the engine downthrust factors is compared to individual
engine downthrust factors to create a downthrust error for each engine. Changes in each
engines thrust command are defined by a proportional-integral controller based on the
downthrust errors.
Finally, the thrust command for each engine is limited to values between 305 klbf and 512
klbf, the normal operating range of the SSME.
To understand the rationale for the ICS propulsion level controller strategy, an understanding
of the downthrust factor is required. The downthrust factor represents the overall engine
condition and is made up of multiple factors representing engine reliability, life usage, and
performance degradation. Two types of effects contribute to the downthrust factor: 1) effects
that are inherent to the engine operation and are related to engine thrust and mixture ratio (e.g.
HPFT turbine speed), and 2) effects which represent a degradation or limitation of the engine
(e.g. HPFT turbine blade cracks). Both types of effects are correlated to one of the downthrust
factor elements, reliability for example, and contribute to the downthrust factor. Cracks in a
the turbine blade are correlated to a reduction in the engine reliability. Decreased turbopump
speed is correlated to an increase in turbopump reliability. The turbopump reliability is
evaluated for the blade cracks and turbopump speed and the turbopump reliability is reflected in
the downthrust factor. A higher reliability results in a lower downthrust factor.
The downthrust factor control strategy is to control the individual engine thrusts so that each
engine has the same downthrust factor. The degradation accommodation scheme achieved by
controlling engine downthrust factors to equal values is illustrated by the following example.
If turbine blade cracks are detected in the HPFT of engine #1, the thrust of engine #1 is
reduced and the thrusts of engines #2 and #3 are increased. Equilibrium is reached when the
high pressure fuel turbopump of engine #1 has reduced its speed to the point where the
reliability of the slow turbine with cracked blades (#1) is equal to the reliability of turbopumps
#2 and #3 operating at higher speeds. This example considers only two of the factors making
up the downthrust factor but accurately illustrates the concept.
The key to the downthrust error loop is the comparison to the average downthrust factor for the
engine cluster. By comparing individual downthmst factors to the average downthrust factor
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for the engine cluster, the sum of the individual engine thrust changes issued by the downthrust
error loop is 0. Therefore, the propulsion system thrust control loop is not affected by the
downthrust factor control loop
Evaluation of the ICS propulsion level controller showed that the propulsion system thrust
control and downthrust factor control loops worked unless an engine degradation was
simulated and one of the engines reached its thrust operating limit. When an engine thrust
operating limit was reached, the downthust factor control loop continued to detect a difference
in individual engine downthrust factors and tried to modify the engine thrust commands to
resolve the difference. Since one of the engines was unable to respond to the thrust command
changes, the changes implemented did not add up to 0 and the propulsion system thrust level
drifted away from the commanded value. To correct the thrust drift problem, the downthrust
factor control loop was modified to ignore the downthrust factor if the engine thrust is at a
thrust limit and the downthrust factor indicates the engine should be commanded beyond the
limit. It was unclear how the downthrust factor control loop modifications could be
implemented using MatrixX, so the simulation was coded in basic and implemented on a PC.
The modified ICS propulsion level controller implemented on a PC is shown in Figure 6-6.
The modifications are indicated by the inclusion of g-functions in the downthrust factor control
loop. The g-function is defined in Figure 6-6 and is used to inhibit the downthrust factor
control for an individual engine if that engine will be commanded beyond its thrust operating
limit. Appendix 5 is the code of the PC version of the simulation.
6.2.4 Demonstration Cases
Simulations of the ICS propulsion level controller were run to demonstrate the feasibility of
controlling individual engine thrusts to accommodate engine degradations within propulsion
system and engine constraints. The demonstration cases run axe summarized below.
MatrixX Demonstration
The ICS propulsion level controller simulation implemented in MatrixX and shown in Figure
6-5 was used for demonstration case A. The timeline for case A is:
t=0.0
t=2.0
t-3.0
t = 3.25
t=4.0
t-6.0
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,500,000 lbf,
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,200,000 lbf
Engine #1 downthust factor begins to ramp upward
Engine #1 downthrust factor stops ramping
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,400,000 lbf
End of simulation
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6-7. The total thrust follows the commanded value
throughout the test. The individual engine thrusts are identical until a degradation in engine #1
is indicated by an increasing downthrust factor at 3.0 seconds into the test. The ICS
propulsion level controller responds by reducing the thrust of engine #1 to accommodate the
degradation and simultaneously increasing the thrusts for engine #2 and #3 to maintain the
commanded propulsion system thrust. At t = 3.25 the engine degradation has stabilized and
the engine thrusts stop changing. When the propulsion system thrust is commanded upward at
t = 4.0, all three engines respond but engine #1, which is indicating a stabilized degradation, is
maintained at a lower thrust than engines #2 and #3.
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PC Demonstration - Case 1
The ICS propulsion level controller simulation shown in Figure 6-6 was used for
demonstration case 1. The timeline for case 1 is:
t=0.0
t= 1.0
t=3.0
t= 8.0
t= 10.0
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,000,000 lbf
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,400,000 lbf
Engine #1 downthrust factor begins to ramp upward
Propulsion system thrust command begins to ramp downward
End of simulation
In case 1, the degradation is assumed to be a gradual loss of high pressure fuel turbine
efficiency resulting in a steady increase in the HPFT temperature.
Case 1 was run for three ICS propulsion level controller configurations. The first run provides
a baseline to compare subsequent simulations ag.ainst and was configured with the downthrust
factor control loop not working. The fin'st run implements the basic control strategy of the
SSME, that is, all three engines are controlled to identical values. The second run has the
downthrust factor control loop working but does not include the g-functions that inhibit engine
commands beyond the engine thrust operating limits. The third case is with the full ICS
propulsion level controller as shown in Figure 6-6.
RUN 1: The simulation results are shown in Figure 6-8. The total thrust follows the
commanded propulsion system thrust except for a lag during the propulsion system
downthrust. All three engines show identical responses throughout the test. It would be a
surprise if they did not since no downthrust factor control is implemented for this run. The
downthrust factors for each engine initially are identical At t = 3.0, engine #1 begins to
indicate a higher than normal HPFT temperature and its downthrust factor increases. The
HPFT temperature crosses the redline at about t=5.0 and continues to increase until engine #1
is downthrust with the others at t - 8.0. The maximum HPFT temperature indicated is about
2150R.
RUN 2: The simulation results are shown in Figure 6-9. The total thrust followed the
commanded propulsion system thrust during the initial step at t = 1.0. All three engines
indicated the same downthrust factor and have identical thrust profiles. At t = 3.0, engine #1
begins to indicate a degradation by an increase in the downthrust factor. The controller
responds by downthrusting engine #1 to accommodate the degradation and simultaneously
upthrusting engines #2 and #3 to maintain the propulsion system thrust at the commanded
value. At about t = 6.5, engines #2 and #3 reach thrust levels of 512 klbf. The thrust
operating limit for the engines is limited to 512 klbf and engines #2 and #3 are not upthrust any
higher. However, the downthrust factor for engine #1 continues to increase and the
downthrust factor control loop continues to attempt to downthrust engine #1 and make up the
loss by upthrusting engines #2 and #3. However, the commands to engines #2 and #3 are
inhibited by the thrust limiter. Therefore, only the downthrust of engine #1 is actually
implemented, causing the propulsion system thrust to drift away from the commanded value.
The propulsion system thrust control loop tries to force engine #1 back to a nominal value but
only succeeds in reducing the downthrust rate of engine #1. Beyond t = 6.5, the propulsion
system thrust continues to drift away from the commanded value.
RUN 3: The simulation results are shown in Figure 6-10. This run represents the fully
implemented ICS propulsion level controller simulation. The propulsion system thrust follows
the commanded value throughout the simulation except for a lag during the commanded
downthrust. All three engines have the same thrust until t = 3.0 when the HPFT of engine #1
begins to lose efficiency. Engine #1 is downthrust to accommodate the loss of HPFT
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efficiencyandengines#2 and#3aresimultaneously upthrust to maintain the propulsion system
thrust at the commanded value. The relationship between the downthrust of engi.'ne #1 and the
upthrust of engines #2 and #3 is such that the HPFT temperature of each engine is near the
same value. Engine #1 continues to lose HPFT efficiency and continues to be downthrust until
engines #2 and #3 reach their maximum operating thrust of 512 klbf. When engines #2 and #3
are at their maximum allowable thrust, no further decrease in engine #1 thrust level is possible
and engine #1 holds at its current thrust level. The engine #1 HPFT continues to lose
efficiency at the same rate it has been and the HPb"r temperature continues to rise. At t = 8.0,
the propulsion system thrust is commanded to a downward ramp. The ICS propulsion level
controller recognizes that engine #1 is indicating a higher de.gradation than the other engines
and implements the entire propulsion system downthrust using engine #1 until engine #1
reaches its lower allowable thrust limit at about t = 9.0. The downthrust of engine #1 causes a
lower HPFT temperature and results in a decrease in the engine #1 downthrust factor. When
engine #1 reaches its lower thrust limit, the propulsion system downthrust is implemented
using engines #2 and #3. If the engine #1 downthrust factor had been reduced to the same
value as the engine #2 and #3 downthrust factors, all three engines would have been
downthrust at proportions that keep the downthrust factors equal while implementing the
propulsion system downthrust. The maximum HPFT temperature indicated is about 1920 R,
over 200 R cooler than case 1 without downthrust factor control.
PC Demonstration - Case 2
The ICS propulsion level controller simulation shown in Figure 6-6 was used for
demonstration case 2. The timeline for case 1 is:
t = 0.0
t=2.0
t= 1.0
t=3.0
t=4.5
t=4.6
t= 6.0
t= 8.0
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,000,000 lbf
Engine #1 downthrust factor steps to 110% of its nominal value
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,400,000 lbf
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,100,000 lbf
Propulsion system thrust command = 1,400,000 lbf
Engine #1 downthrust factor steps to 120% of its nominal value
Engine #2 downthrust factor begins to ramp upward
Propulsion system thrust command begins to ramp downward
In case 2, the degradation in engine #1 is assumed to be caused by a nozzle tube rupture at t =
2.0 resulting in fuel leakage and the further nozzle tube rupturing at t = 4.6 causing greater fuel
leakage. The degradation in engine #2 is assumed to be a gradual loss of specific impulse
degrading the engine performance.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6-11. The propulsion system thrust follows the
commanded value throughout the test. All three engines have identical thrusts until t = 2.0
when a nozzle tube ruptures on engine #1 causing a sudden increase in the engine #1
downthrust factor. The ICS propulsion level controller responds by downthrusting engine #1
and upthrusting engine #2 and #3 until the downthrust factors for each engine are equal
indicating that the degradation of engine #1 is equivalent to the engine degradation caused by
the higher operating thrust of engines #2 and #3. When the propulsion system thrust is given a
step downthrust command at t = 3.0, all three engines decrease their thrust in a proportion that
keeps the individual engine downthrust factors the same. At t = 4.5, the propulsion system
thrust is given a step upthrust command and all three engines respond. During the upthrust
transient, more nozzle tubes rupture on engine #1 and engine #1 is downthrust. Meanwhile,
engines #2 and #3 have reached their maximum operating thrust and the engine #1 thrust settles
to a value that maintains the commanded propulsion system thrust. At t - 6.0, engine #2
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beginsto losespecificimpulsecausingtheengine#2downthrustfactor to increase. Initially,
the ICS propulsion level controller takes no action since the engine #2 thrust cannot be
decreased within the constraints of the propulsion system thrust command unless the engine #1
thrust is increased (engine #3 is at its upper thrust limit) and engine #1 is indicating greater
problems than engine #2 (i.e. a greater downthrust factor). When the engine #2 downthrust
factor exceeds the engine #1 downthrust factor, the propulsion level controller acknowledges
that engine #2 has degraded as much as engine #1.and begins to trade engine #1 thrust for
engine #2 thrust in proportion to make the downthrust factors equal. At t = 8.0 when the
propulsion system thrust is commanded to ramp downward, engine #2 (which continues to
degrade) continues to be downthrust, though at a slightly higher rate since the downthrust is no
longer forcing engine #1 to higher thrust levels. Engine #1 is held at a constant thrust level.
Engine #2 continues to be downthrust until it reaches its lower thrust limit and then the
propulsion level controller begins to downthrust engine #1 to maintain the commanded
propulsion system thrust.
Summary
The ICS propulsion level controller commands the individual engine thrusts to values that
minimize the maximum downthrust factor while maintaining the commanded propulsion
system thrust and keeping each engine within its safe operating thrust range.
6.2.5 Simulation of an SSME Failure Case
The feasibility of the ICS propulsion level controller strategy was demonstrated by the
demonstration cases described in Section 6.2.4. To further demonstrate the utility of the ICS
propulsion level controller, an SSME failure is simulated. The failure summary is taken from
the SAFD phase I report.
Test 902-249: During stable operation at 109% of rated power level the test shut down
prematurely due to a HPFTP accelerometer redline and associated massive failure of the HPFT
first stage turbine blade. The sequence of events leading to the blade failure follows:
1. Initial turbine damage at t = 3.0 seconds. The FPB injectors non-uniform flow condition
experienced in at least two previous tests may have persisted (despite rework) and worsened.
2. Engine fuel inlet temperature increases and the high pressure fuel pump begins to cavitate at
t - 108 seconds. The temperature increase was brought about by a .propellent transfer. The
increased temperature lowers the fuel density causing an increase m the HPFP volumetric
flowrate, speed, and power necessary to hold thrust constant. As the flow and speed increase,
the HPFP approaches the conditions at which the suction capability of the hardware is
exceeded and cavitation starts. Once cavitation is initiated, the efficiency of the pump
degrades, causing the HPFI'P speed to increase to maintain the fuel pump output to hold thrust
constant, causing worsening cavitation conditions and causing an increase in the HPFT
temperature.
3. A Kel-F rub ring flexes and melts at t = 374 seconds. The released Kel-F particles plug
nozzle tubes causing them to rupture, contributing to the HPFT temperature increase.
4. The first stage turbine blade fails at t = 450.52 seconds.
Post firing inspection of the facility and engine revealed severe damage to the main combustion
chamber including the injector and sidewalls, extensive burnthrough damage to the nozzle,
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substantial damage to the HPFTP first and second stage turbines, and an approximately 12 inch
long section of the HPFP inlet volute missing.
For the simulation, a typical STS flight thrust profile is used as the propulsion system thrust
command. The failure is assumed to happen at the same time as the failure that occured during
test 902-249. The downthrust factor is assumed to follow a linear estimation of the HPFT
temperature recorded during the test and shown in Figure 6-12.
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6-13. The individual thrust profiles using the
ICS propulsion level controller are identical to the thrust prof'tles that would be expected with
the current SSME controller until the HPFT temperature starts to rise. The current SSME
controller would have held the engine at a constant thrust until the propulsion system thrust
command was changed at about 460 seconds. The ICS propulsion level controller begins to
reduce the degraded engine thrust at about 325 seconds and continues to reduce it until the
other two engines reach the upper thrust limit of 512 klbf. At the time of failure, 450 seconds
into the flight, the ICS propulsion level controller has reduced the degraded engine thrust to
slightly under 94% of the rated power level whereas the current SSME controller would have
maintained the engine at its nominal 104% thrust level. At 460 seconds, when the propulsion
system thrust command is ramped down, the ICS propulsion level controller implements the
entire downthrust using the degraded engine resulting in a rapid decrease in thrust level until
the degraded engine reaches its lower thrust limit at 65% of RPL. Downthrusting the engine is
clearly the correct response to the anomaly since downthrusting the engine reduces the output
demanded of the HPFP. The HPFP speed decreases and reduces cavitation in the pump.
Whether or not the downthrust is sufficient to have averted the failure is impossible to say.
However, if the engine had still failed it would have failed at a reduced power level.
6.3 ICS Simulation Conclusions
The ICS simulations demonstrate that individual engine parameters can be controlled to reduce
engine operating stresses within the constraints imposed by mission requirements (thrust and
mixture ratio). Furthermore, the simulations demonstrate the capability to control an engine
cluster to extend the propulsion system life using a calculated engine health parameter.
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SECTION 7 ICS ADVANCED FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The ICS advanced functional framework represents a control system that fully integrates the
ICS control objectives of 1) maximum reliability, 2) minimum maintenance, and 3) maximum
efficiency. The thrust and mixture ratio of each engine are controlled to meet the propulsion
system thrust and mixture ratio requirements by a propulsion level controller. Individual
engine control is limited to implementing the propulsion system commands in the manner that
maximizes individual engine performance, efficiency, and life and includes feedback to the
propulsion level. The propulsion system is controlled as an integrated system, rather than as a
collection of individual engines (the approach used in current rocket engine propulsion
systems). The integrated propulsion system is expected to increase the overall propulsion
system reliability, performance, and useful life by enabling tradeoffs between individual
engines and thereby mitigating the effects of the "weak link" in the system.
The proposed advanced functional framework is shown in Figure 7-1. The controller consists
of a mission level controller that defines the requirements of the propulsion system, a
propulsion level controller that coordinates implementation of the propulsion system
requirements, and an engine level controller, for each engine, that implements the engine
requirements in the most favorable manner for that engine. The mission level controller
evaluates the requirements for mission completion and issues overall propulsion system thrust
and mixture ratio commands. The propulsion level controller evaluates the propulsion system
thrust and mixture ratio commands and controls each engine thrust and mixture ratio to
implement the propulsion system thrust and mixture ratio. The distribution of thrust and
mixture ratio between individual engines is determined based on the health, efficiency, and
remaining life of each engine. The engine level controller implements the thrust and mixture
ratio commands from the propulsion level controller by issuing position commands to the
engine valves. Since only two engine variables are controlled to "hard" values, and seven
control valves are available on the proposed engine configuration, multiple sets of valve
commands result in implementation of the "hard" variables (thrust and mixture ratio). The
engine level controller evaluates the sets of valve commands that can implement the
commanded engine thrust and mixture ratio and selects the set that minimizes the cost to the
engine. Unless otherwise specified, cost is defined in terms of engine wear, risk of engine
failure, and performance losses.
The advanced functional framework is made up of two types of functions: 1) controller
adaptation functions and 2) real time control loop functions. The real time control loop
functions are implemented during every major cycle of the controller. The real time control
loop functions implement and maintain the propulsion system thrust and mixture ratio
according to the commands from the mission level controller. The controller adaptation
functions modify parameters within the real time control loop to optimize control of the
propulsion system in response to existing or predicted conditions that exist within the engine
subsystems. Definitions of each functional element in the framework are provided below.
7.1 Controller Adaptation Functions
The controller adaptation functions are non-real time functions that evaluate engine conditions
and modify the response of the real time control functions to optimize control of the propulsion
system. The timing of the controller adaptation functions is not constant. The controller
adaptation functions evaluate critical conditions on an interrupt basis and can quickly modify
the real time control loop in response to a sudden engine degradation. Non missxon critical
conditions are evaluated at a slower rate. For example, during normal en .gine operation the
remaining life of multiple turbopump components may be inferred from engane measurements
and the real time control loop modified to reflect the new remaining life values every so often.
However, if the HPFT temperature suddenly increases, the remaining life calculauons are put
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on hold and the real time control loop is immediately modified to accommodate the temperature
rise. Once the temperature accommodation is implemented, the remaining life calculations are
resumed.
Each of the controller adaptation functions and their supporting functions are described in the
following sections.
Estimate Remainin_ Life of Critical Components
The purpose of this function is to estimate the remaining life of engine components. Four
approaches to estimate component remaining life are proposed. They are: 1) direct
measurement of remaining life, 2) direct measurement of life used, 3) estimation of damage
accumulation based on detailed damage models, and 4) estimation of damage accumulation
based on empirical data. The prefered method, where possible, is to directly measure the
remaining life of a component, for example measuring the wall thickness of the MCC coolant
channels. The second approach considered is to directly measure the damage that has occured
in a particular component. An example of direct damage measurement is to measure the radial
displacement of a turbopump shaft to infer the amount of turbopump bearing wear. If no direct
measurements are available, the next approach tried is to estimate the remaining life of a
component based on the accumulated damage predicted by a detailed damage model using real
time engine measurements (temperatures, pressures, vibrations, etc.). Finally, if there are no
direct measurements and no damage model available, the remaining life of a component is
estimated based on the number of engine starts, time at each power level, etc. The output of
this function is an estimate of the remaining life and a standard deviation reflecting the certainty
in the estimate for each specific component evaluated.
Engine Diamaostics
The purpose of this function is to identify specific conditions that exist within the engine.
Examples of diagnostic capabilities include the identification of cracked turbine blades, failure
of turbopump bearings, sensor failures, and nozzle fuel leaks. The technique used to identify
each condition is specific to the condition being evaluated. The output of this function is a
probability distribution for the magnitude of a specific condition if applicable, or the probability
that a condition has been identified if there is no magnitude associated with the condition. For
example, the output for a fuel leak would be the probability distribution that a specific
magnitude fuel leak exists. The output for a sensor failure would be the probability that the
sensor reading is correct.
Define Weighting Factors
The purpose of this function is to assign weights to critical engine parameters. Critical engine
parameters include the high pressure turbine temperatures, turbopump vibrations, MCC
temperatures, and the high pressure pump net .pump suction heads. Engine parameters also
include transient parameters such as changes m a high pressure turbine temperature. The
probable remaining life of critical components and likely engine conditions are evaluated to
define weights to each parameter. The parameter weights reflect the combination of all factors
associated with that parameter and take into account both the severity and likelihood of each
factor. As an example, a turbopump bearing with a high probability of little remaining life and
a pump operating near its suction limit (where cavitation begins) both indicate that the weight
associated with turbopump speed should be increased. The output of this function is a
numerical value representing the weight associated with each engine parameter considered by
the weighted cost calculation in the real time control loop.
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Vglve/Actuator Models
The valve/actuator models are dynamic models of each valve response. Engine valve
commands issued by the real time control loop and the pressure drop across each valve are
used as inputs to the valve models. The output of each model is the predicted time dependent
position of each valve.
Valve/Actuator Dia_maostics
The purpose of the this function is to identify valves/actuators that have failed or that are likely
to fail. The valve/actuator diagnostics compare the valve position predicted by the
valve/actuator models with the positions indicated by engine sensors. Disagreements between
the two position indications are evaluated to determine the health/availability of each valve. The
output of this function is the probability of failure for each control valve.
Estimate Model Parameters
The purpose of this function is characterization of the engine operating state to anchor the
engine model used in the real time control loop. Characterization includes the estimated
efficiency of each high pressure turbine and each high pressure pump. Characterization also
includes specific engine conditions which can change the effect of the control valves on the
engine. For example, a nozzle fuel leak would cause the high pressure turbines to run
abnormally hot and changes in the preburner oxidizer valve position would result in a greater
temperature increase than normally expected. The output of this function is a numerical value
for each model element characterized.
Pro,ulsion System Diagnostics
The purpose of this function is to evaluate the condition of each engine and estimate the
probability that the propulsion system is able to implement the overall thrust and mixture ratio
required for mission completion or abort modes. The mission requirements (e.g. maximum
thrust required for the flight prof'tle, remaining mission time) are sent to the propulsion system
diagnostics function by the mission controller for the current mission and possible abort
modes. The propulsion system diagnostics evaluate the condition of each engin, e and estimates
the probability that the propulsion system will be able to implement the mission requirements
without a catastrophic failure in the propulsion system. The output of this function is a
probability of success for the current mission and each abort mode possible. The mission level
controller uses the success probabilities for the propulsion system (and those for other major
subsystems) to evaluate the current mission and abort modes and decide on the course of action
that has the highest likely payoff.
Determine Allowable En_ne Thrust and Mixture Ratio Ranges
The purpose of this function is to determine the thrust and mixture ratio ranges that can be
implemented by each engine. The allowable ranges are determined by the availability of engine
control valves to implement changes. For example, if an engines FPOV fails, the thrust and
mixture ratio changes that can be implemented are severely limited. The output of this function
is a range of allowable engine thrusts and mixture ratios. An example of the output thrust
range for an individual engine is shown Figure 7-2. The solid line indicates the range for a
nominal engine and the dashed line represents the allowable range for an engine with a failed
actuator.
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D_termine Weighted En_ne Thrust and Mixture Ratio Ranges Based on Engine Condition
The purpose of this function is to estimate the cost associated with operating the engine at each
thrust or mixture ratio in its allowable range. Cost for this function is defined in terms of the
risk of engine failure during the mission. In all cases, the cost of operating an engine is greater
at higher thrust levels. Higher thrust levels result in higher failure risk in almost all cases. In
addition to the nominal cost associated with each thrust and mixture ratio, specific engine
conditions are evaluated to modify the "cost distribution" for each engine. For example, the
cost of operating an engine at a given thrust with a degraded turbopump bearing is higher than
the cost of operating a nominal engine at the same thrust. The probability and magnitude of
specific engine conditions are used to define the likely cost at each thrust and mixture ratio.
The output of this function is the cost associated with operating each engine at specific thrust
and mixture ratios. Figure 7-3 shows the cost for an individual engine as a function of engine
thrust if the cost distribution is linear. The solid line represents a nominal engine and the
dashed line represents a degraded engine. Engine degradations are expected to increase the
slope and height of the cost distribution.
Modify Weighted En_ne Thrust and Mixture Ratio Ranges Based on En_ne Efficiency
The purpose of this function is to modify the weighted engine thrust and mixture ratio ranges
based on the cost associated with performance losses. Nominally, the engine performance is
greatest at the rated thrust and drops off to either side. Engine performance also peaks at a
specific mixture ratio and drops off to either side. Depending on the engine design, the
nominal mixture ratio may not be the mixture ratio at which the highest engine performance is
achieved. In addition to the nominal cost distribution, engine performance parameters (e.g.
HPOP efficiency) are evaluated to determine the performance of each specific engine relative to
a nominal engine. Changes in engine performance parameters are expected to effect the overall
height of the cost distribution. Figure 7-4 shows the linear cost distribution from the weighted
engine thrust example used in the previous example modified to reflect the cost associated with
engine efficiency. The solid line is a nominal engine and the dashed line represents a less
efficient engine.
Modify_ Weighted En_ne Thrust and Mixture Ratio Ranges Based on Remaining En_ne Life
The purpose of this function is to modify the weighted engine thrust and mixture ratio ranges
based on the cost associated with remaining engine life. The cost, in terms of engine life, to
operating an engine is greater at higher thrust and mixture ratios. The nominal cost distribution
is modified by the estimated remaining engine component life probabilities. An engine that
indicates little remaining life has a higher cost to operate than a nominal engine. Differences in
remaining engine life change the slope and the height of the cost distribution. Figure 7-5
shows the linear cost distribution used in the previous example modified to reflect the
remaining life of the engine. The output of this function is the total cost for operating each
engine at specific thrust and mixture ratios.
7.2 Real Time Control Loop Functions
The real time control loop functions are the functions that produce outputs during eve.ry, major
cycle of the control system. These functions are responsible for achieving and maintammg me
propulsion system thrust and mixture ratio at the values commanded by the mission
coordinator. The real time control functions at the individual engine level evaluate the engine
status and implement the propulsion level controller commands with the lowest cost to the
individual engines. Additionally, the real time control loop functions initiate changes in the
individual engine states in response to engine conditions.
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/ Thrust and Mixture Ratio Estimator
The purpose of this function is to evaluate engine measurements and provide an estimate of the
engine thrust and mixture ratio.
I_sue Lowest Cost Set of Engine Thrusts and Mixture Ratios to Individual Enones
The purpose of this function is to evaluate errors in the propulsion level thrust and mixture ratio
and issue thrust and mixture ratio command to each engine. The propulsion level controller
distributes the thrust and mixture ratio between individual engines to minimize the maximum
individual engine cost. Minimizing the maximum individual engine cost is proposed since the
engine cluster is limited in life, reliability, and performance by its weakest member. Figure 7-6
shows conceptually how this function operates. The total cost distribution for three engines is
shown. Engine #2 represents a nominal engine, engine #1 is degraded, and engine #3 has a
failed control valve. If the measured thrust is lower than the commanded thrust the propulsion
level controller issues an upthrust command. The thrust commands to individual engines reflect
the associated cost for each engine. In the example shown in Figure 7-6, engine #2 is
commanded to its maximum operating thrust and the remainder of the thrust error is corrected
by engines #1 and #3 with engine #1 making up the majority of the error. Conceptually, the
propulsion level controller moves the command line (dashed line in the Figure 7-6) up and
down in response to measured propulsion system thrust errors.
If the cost distribution for an individual engine changes, the thrust command for that engine is
changed which results in a propulsion system thrust error and the command line is adjusted to
resolve the error. For example, take the case when all three engines are initially operating
nominally and engine #2 suddenly develops a nozzle leak. The slope and height of engine #2s
cost distribution suddenly increase changing the point at which engine #2s cost distribution
crosses the command line. Engine #2 is downthrust causing an error in the propulsion system
thrust. The command line is moved upward upthrusting all three engines until a new
equilibrium is reached in which engines #1 and #3 are now operating at higher thrusts than
engine #2 but the propulsion system thrust is at its original value.
Determine Possible Solutions
The purpose of this function is to determine the set of valve commands that implement the
thrust and mixture ratio commands received from the propulsion level controller. The only
external commands to the engine system are thrust and mixture ratio. Since seven control
valves are used in the proposed system, multiple combinations of valve position changes are
available to resolve the thrust and mixture ratio errors. The status of each valve/actuator is used
to determine which valve position changes can be implemented. If the FPOV has failed and is
locked in position, no combinations requiring a change in FPOV position will be output. The
output of this function is the set of valve position commands that can be implemented to resolve
the thrust and mixture ratio errors. Figure 7-7 shows an example of the data content of this
functions output.
t_timate En_ne Parameters for Each Solution
The purpose of this function is to estimate engine parameters expected to result from the
implementation of each combination of valve position commands identified as possible
solutions. Engine parameters are estimated for each possible solution by inputing the valve
position commands to an engine model. The engine model is kept current with engine
measurements and parameters estimated by the controller adaptation functions. The output of
this function is a set of engine parameters for each combination of valve commands identified
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as possible solutions. Figure 7-8 shows an example of the data content of this functions
output.
Calculate Weighted Cost of Each Solution
The purpose of this function is to estimate the cost associated with implementing each set of
valve commands identified as possible solutions. The weighted cost associated with each
solution is determined by calculating the sum of the engine parameters multiplied by their
weighting factors. The cost of a solution will change depending on engine conditions and
remaining life. If an engine failure occurs and the parameter weighting factors change, a set of
valve position commands different than the current set of valve positions may have the lowest
cost. In this case the new valve commands will be implemented, changing the engine state but
not affecting the engine thrust or mixture ratio. This function is shown conceptually in Figure
7-9.
Imolement Solution With Lowest Cost
The purpose of this function is to implement the set of valve position commands that represents
the lowest cost to the engine. In the example shown in Figures 7-7 to 7-9, solution #4 would
be implemented.
7.3 Advanced Functional Framework Conclusions
The proposed framework is computationaUy intensive, but provides an integrated set of
propulsion system functions that optimize propulsion system performance, increase
propulsion system reliability, and extend the useful life of the propulsion system. The
functions proposed enable the propulsion system controller to continuously evaluate individual
engine statuses and implement the mission required thrust and mixture ratio commands in the
manner that optimizes propulsion system life, reliability, and performance.
RI/RD91-158 PAGE 52
go
Mission Level
I
I
I
Thrust and elF
Requirements | /
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Thrust and elF
req'd for nominal |
and abort modes
I
_'_ Operating Cost
at Each Mode |
Propulsion Level
I
Thrust and
o_ |
Commands
)._ Issue Lowest Cost Set o| IEngine Thrusts and O/Fs to |Individual Engines
=
I I ModifyWeightedEngineI
IThrust and elF Ranges Based _-_
I I on Remaining EngineLife I
, t
Thrust and elF Ranges
| Based on Engine Efficiency
, f
II IBased°nEneC°ndi'i°nsJg;I_ .I| Dalarmlne Allowable Engine _., I
I Thrust and elf Ranges Based I i
Diagnostics _ |
Engine Level
Determine i
Possible
Solutions
Eslimalod Model
Paramelors
_ Estimate Engine
Parameters for
Each Solution
Remaining Life Estimates
I Estimate
Model
Parameters
Pre ilcted I Calculate
_ Weighted
Cost of Each
Solution
Nelghttng
Array
._ Define
Weighting
Factors
Estimated I
Implement
Solution with
Lowest Cost
Estimate Remaining
Life of Critical
Components
Valve
Position &
Status
I ___I ValvelAct, ator i"I
I Diagnostics I_
|. .l_,
i
Probability of Specific
Engine Conditions
Analytical Estimate of Valve Position
Engine ]_Diagnostics
I Valve/ActuatorI Models
Valve Lock-up Command
Thrust and Mixlure Ratio Estimates
Thrust and I
Mixture Ratio i
Estimator ]
I
I
I
Cdtical
| Engine
Parameters
I Valve
Command; _
I
Engine
i II Damage< I o_fa
I
Engine
Performance
Data
I
Engine| Health
Data
I
Pressure
| Drop
Across
| EachValve
I_ Valve
Positions
|>
Pc Mn M[
I
Figure 7-1 ICS Advanced Functional Framework
65% Thrust
!
! I.--
109%
Figure 7-2 Allowable Thrust Range
65% Thrust 109 '/o
Figure 7-3 Weighted Engine Thrust
Figure 7-4
i
i_ _
65% Thrust 1()9%
Engine Efficiency Modification To Weighted Engine Thrust
Figure 7-5
65% Thrust 109
Remaining Engine Life Modification to Weighted Engine Thrust
RI/RI_l-158
/•
...;.;;u,.;.;.. ,;.;_...¢......................_ / _ ""
up Thrust I __" ./
......................._......._ ........._..._ .....................
• •
Engine #3 " 1
65% Thrust 109%
Figure 7-6 Three Engine Thrust Control Strategy
RI/RI_I-158
.Solution ID MFV MOV FPOV OPOV CCV F7V LPOTV
1 +0.01 -0.03 +0.01 -0.02 +0.135 -0.003 -0.013
2 -0.013 +0.001 -0.003 +0.001 +0.001 +0.01 +0.135
3 +0.01 -0.02 +0.034 +0.01 +0.034 -0.03 +0.01
4 0.0 +0.001 -0.005 +0.001 -0.002 +0.001
5
-0.003
+0.135+0.001-0.002 +0,001-0.03 0.0
Figure 7-7 Possible Solutions
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Figure 7-8 Estimated Engine Parameters
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Figure 7-9 Weighted Cost of Each Solution
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Appendix 1
SSME Start Transient Simulation Results
Nominal Case
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Appendix 2
SSME Start Transient Simulation Results
FPOV 1st Notch @ 0.60 seconds
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Appendix 3
ssME Start Transient Simulation Results
FPOV 1st Notch @ 0.75 seconds
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Appendix 4
Listing of SSME Start Transient Control Actions
Slem Action
Time
(seconds)
Update Engine Status Word to Start Initia-
tion mode of Start phase.
0
2
3
Limit OPOV command to 70% and FPOV com-
mand to 56.1%. Set initial OPOU Delta
Power Level to 9.65517%. NOTE - For FRT limit
OPOV command to a constant 1@@% throughout
START/MAINSTAGE.
Reset TIME REFERENCE to Zero.
Initial conditions o£ propellant and
pneumatic valves assumed per ending status
of Start Preparation phase (except for Engine
Fuel Purge). Energize all igniters.
Set MCC Pressure Reference at 731 psia.
De-energize Fuel System Purge Control Valve
Cha_mel A and Channel B.
Initiate Shutdown Limit Monitoring for HPOP
Intermediate Seal Purge, and HPOT Secondary
Seal Cavity Pressures.
Initiate Sensor Qualification Monitoring
for lIPOT Turbine Discharge Temperature.
Initiate Shutdown Limit Monitoring
£o_ Preburner S/D Purge Pressures.
Ramp MFV to 10@% actuator position
at 150%/second actuator rate.
9 Set Sequence foL- Shutdown from Start.
(a) Set FPOV shutdown compare position No. 3
to 43% open.
(b) Set FPOV shutdown actuator rate No. 2
to 14%/second.
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L, Action
Time
(seconds)
10
11
(Continued)
(c) Set OPOV shutdown actuator rate No. 3
to 70%/second.
(d) Set OPOV shutdown actuator rate (effective
at Shutdown+l.42 sec) to 70%Isec.
(e) Set Preburner Shutdown purge ON time
equation to accommodate time = 2.2
see at RPL and time = 1.8 sec at 65%
RPL.
Ramp HOV to 59.3% actuator position
at 60%/sec actuator rate.
Ramp-FPOV to 30% actuator position
at 200%/sec actuator rate.
_. 10
12 Ramp OPOV to 30% actuator position at
200%/second actuator Face.
0.12
/,
[j
L.
13
14
15
16
17
Ramp FPOV to 56.1% actuator position
at 200%/sec actuator rate.
Ramp OPOV to 48.0% actuator position at
20.O%/sec actuator rate.
Ramp FPOV to 47.0% actuator position at
2OO%/sec actuator Fate.
Change FPOV and OPOV ramp rates to 100
percent per second and 100 percent
per second respectively.
Initiate closed-loop MCC Pressure control
(proportional error control only). In addition
continue to completion the OPST schedule.
Initial value oE propor-
tional error control
gain = 0.01444
percent/psia
@.26
_}.28
0.68
0.74
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Action
Time
(seconds)
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
26
26a
27
28
29
29a
Ramp MCC Pressure reference to 406 psia at
8.0 psi/20 reset.
Set FPOV crossfeed gain to 0.4596% per %
and ramp to 1.15% per % at 0.5676% per Z per
second. In addition continue to completion
the FPST schedule.
Ramp FPOV to 51.5 percent actuator position
at 200 percent per second actuator rate.
Ramp OPOV to 38.5 percent actuator position
at 200 percent per second actuator rare.
Ramp FPOV to 49.0 percent actuator position
at 200 percent per second actuator Fate.
Check IIPFP Shaft Speed within limits for
ignition confirmation.
Ramp CCV to 70 percent actuator position
at 100 percent per second.
Ramp OPOV to 38.5 percent actuator
position at 200 percent per second actuator
rate.
Ramp FPOV to 54.6 percent actuator position
at 200 percent per second actuator rate.
Verify Main Combustion Chamber Pressure is
within ignition confirm limits.
Ramp OPOV to 48.5 percent actuator position
at 200 percent per second actuator rate.
Initiate channel qualification monitoring
o_ HCC Pressure as a function o£ Pc
Reference Value.
Honitor for DCII switchover or PFI/PRI
sequence for Ant if:food valve monitoring
delay.
Latest time to perform Shutdown Limit
Monitoring on Preburner Shutdown Purge
Pressures.
0.80
0.88
I. I0
1.16
1.24
1.46
1.50
1.68
1.70
2.10
2.26
2.28
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31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Action
Time
(seconds)
Verify Main Combustion Chamber Pressure is
within limits and Antiflood Valve is open
for ignition confirmation.
Initiate Shutdown Limit Monitoring of
HPOT Turbine Discharge Temperature
Upper Limit.
Change FPOV command limit to i_2%.
Retain OPOV command limit 7@%.
2.38
Terminate monitoring for DCU switchover
or PFI/PRI sequence.
Set Backup DCU ignition confirmation
for MCC Pc and AFV.
Ramp OPOV to 49.1 percent actuator position
and change OPOV ramp rate limit to 100%
per second.
Ramp FPOV to 56.85 percent actuator position
and change FPOV ramp rate limit to 100% per
second.
Switch to Mainstage gain value of proportional
error control and ac__ttivateintegral error
control for HCC Pressure.
" -- 2
Activate POGO Precharge Control Valve Channel
A and Channel B
2.40
39
40
41
42
43
Step RCC Pressure reference to 737 psia,
then ramp MCC Pressure reference to command
level at 34.46 psi/2@ msec rate.
De-energize all igniters.
Ramp MOV to 100% actuator position at
31.50%/sec actuator rate.
Ramp CCV to 52% actuator position at
45.@%/second actuator rate.
Update Engine Status Uord to indicate
Thrust Buildup mode, if Hydraulic
or Electrical Lockup not in effect.
2.42
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44
45
46
46a
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
Action
Terminate channel qualification monitoring
of MCC Pressure as a function of Pc Reference
value.
Initiate channel "band test" qualification
monitoring of MCC Pressure as a function of
Pc Reference value.
Initiate scheduled operation of CCV as a
function of MCC Pressure Reference (CCV =
52% at 50% RPL; CCV = 100% at RPL)
Initiate Fuel Flovrate individual sensor
qualification tests and inter-channel test
Initiate OPOV command limiting as a function
of Pc Reference.
Initiate closed-loop mixture ratio control
(proportional plus integral control_
Initiate both MCF Limit monitoring
and Lower Shutdown Limit monitoring for HPOT
Turbine Discharge Temperature
De-activate POGO Precharge Control Valve
Channel A and Channel B
Verify POGO Precllarge pressure is within
limits.
Last time to monitor POGO Precharge
pressure.
Reinitialize control-loop integrators to
zero as required. Reinitialize OPST and
FPST so that OPOV command and FPOV command
remain unchanged by reinitialization.
Set Mainstage Pc Reference Rate Limit to
6 psi/20 msec. Set maximum rate limits for
FPOV and OPOV total valve command positions
to 200%/second.
Initiate scheduled operation of MOV as a
function of MCC Pressure Reference. (MOV =
100% at 50% RPL; MOV = 100% at RPL).
Initiate scheduled operation of MFV as a
function of MCC Pressure Reference. (MFV =
100% at 50% RPL; MFV = 100% at RPL.)
Time
(seconds)
2.80
3.50
3.80
4.40
4.94
4.98
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57
58
59
60
Action
Set Sequence for Shutdown from Mainstage
(a) Set FPOV Shutdoun compare position No. 3
to 40% open.
(b) Set FPOV Shutdown actuator rate No.'2 to
18%/second.
(c) Set OPOV Shutdown actuator rate No. 3 to
30%/second.
(d) Set OPOV Shutdown actuator rate (effective
at Shutdown + 1.42 sec) to 200%/second.
(e) Set Preburner Shutdown Purge ON time
equation to accommodate time = 1.8 sec at
RPL and at 65% RPL (i.e., zero slope).
Change engine phase of Engine Status
Uord to Mainstage. If in Hydraulic
Lockup, Electrical Lockup, or Fixed
Density then report the corresponding
mode in the Engine Status Word, else
report Normal Control in the Engine
Status Uord.
Change crossfeed gain schedule.
Discontinue "band test" and initiate
"delta test" to qualify MCC Pressure
channels as a function of Pc Reference
value.
Initiate monitor for OPOV position.
Time
(seconds)
5.00
5.02
61 Initiate both Sensor Qualification and
Shutdown Limit Monitoring for HPFY TDT,
IIPFP Coolant Liner Pressure, and MCC Pc.
Terminate monitor for maximum OPOV position.
Calculate OPOV Delta Power Level using the
maximum OPOU position observed between 5.02
and 5.5 seconds. Use OPOV Delta Power Level
and Pc Reference to determine a dynamic OPOV
Command Limit each Major Cycle.
5.04
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Appendix 5
ICS Propulsion Level Simulation
BASIC code listing
'ics propulsion level simulation, icsp9
.screen 1
iedl=O
ied2=O
ied3=O
iet=O
' define output file
open "icspZ.out" for output as !
tmax=lO
dr=.02
for t=O to tmax step dt
Input Parameters
'thrust command
tc=lO00000
if t>l then tc=1400000
if t>2 then tc=1100000
if t>4.5 then tc=140000C
if t>8 then tc=i4OOOOO-_t-_'xlO00_C
'downthrusz deviatlons
dl=dla
dl=d2a
d3=d3a
_= t> _ then _I-_ !*dla
if t>4.5 then dl=l.2Zdla
i£ t>6 then _-_o=*ri-_z-6 ' t=*_ _
' engine models
dfla=(fl-fla)/O.l
fla=fla÷dfla*dt
dla=O.OOOOO1*fla÷0.43
df2a=(f2-f2a)/O.l
_2a=f2a÷df2a*dt
d2a=O.OOOOO1*f2a÷0.42
df3a=(f3-f3a)/O.l
f3a=f3a÷df3a*dt
d3a=O.OOOOOl*_3a+0.43
_1-158
-' " : " controller'- ........
i'
k0=l:'ThrustError Proportional Gain
kl=5:'Thrust Error Zntegral Gain
k2=100000:'Downthrust Factor proportional Gain
k3=5000000:'Downthrumt Fact?r _ntegraL Gain
da=(dl÷d2_d3)13
g1=1
gZ=l
g3=1
if f1<305001 then if dl-da,0 then _i=0
if f1>511999 then if dl-da<0 then gl=0
if f2<305001 then if d2-da>0 then g2=0
if f2>511999 then if c_-da<0 then g2=0
if f3<305001 then if d3-da>0 then g3=0
if f3>511999 then if d3-da<0 then g3=0
if gl÷gl+g3=0 then edl=0:ecL_=0:ed3=0:_oto I0
da=(gl=dl÷gZ=d2+g3=d3)/(gl÷gZ+g3)
edl=gl=(dl-da)
ed2.=g2=(d2-da)
ed2=g3m(d3-da)
10 '
et=tc-fla-f2a-f3a
iedl=iedl-(k2=edl)=dZ
iedl=ied!-{k2"edZi=_Z
ied3=ied3-ik3=ed_*_t
_i=iez_K0=et-iedl-_Zedl
_l=iez+k0"ez-ied2-K_=ed2
£2=iet_0Zez-ied3-h_"ed2
if fi<305000 _hen f1=305000
i_ £1>512000 then fi=512000
if _2<305000 then f2=305000
if fZ>512000 then f2=51ZO00
!f f3<305000 _hen f_=305000
if f_>512000 then f3=512000
i
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' screen output
loca_e l,l:prin_ int(fla):int(£2a);int(f3a);int(£1a*f2a÷f3a),int(lOOO'd2)/lO00
p_c=_c/165
pfla=_la/165
p_2a=_Za/155
pf3a=_3a/165
circle [t=3OO/tmax,60-(p_c-5000)=60/6000),-1'1
Circle (t=3OO/tmax.60-(p_la÷pz2a÷P _3e-50_).50/6000)''I'2
clrcle
c_r.!
(t*300/tmax,lZO-(pfla-1500)*50/1500),.1,1
it*_OO/tmax,120-(p_2a-1600)*50/1600),.1,2
!:"300/_max,!ZO-(p_3a-1600)*50/1500),.1,3
circle
_lr_ °- -le
circle
,tz300/tmax,180-(d1)zSO) _,,
_ r e- -
<_=300/tmaz, 180-(d2)=60), i
Z*3OO/zmax,180-(d2)*501,.l,3
pri..-.i,_# t,lnz: __-.....,lnz[_la-_ia-£3a_ inz!_ia in_(_2a) in_(f3a) dl,d_,d3
/r
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